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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The interaction between armed forces and civilian organizations providing 
medical and health aid in insecure environments is increasing.  Recent examples 
include a US-led, anti-insurgent Joint Task Force providing disaster relief after 
mudslides in the Philippines, the international response to the Asian tsunami and 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Practitioners and scholars alike have noted 
that the rising incidence of civil-military medical assistance increases the need for 
better operational coordination and cooperation among the actors in the medical 
and health sector of humanitarian assistance. 
 
From January 29 to February 2, 2006, representatives from the US government, 
United Nations, and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
participated in an educational game at the Center for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California. The game focused on the operational challenges associated with 
providing medical and health assistance as part of disaster relief and 
development assistance in regions of conflict or instability. Three scenarios were 
used, and participants took the role of representing their respective medical 
communities:  military, civilian government, international organization, and 
international nongovernmental organization. The first scenario focused on 
disaster relief in a post-conflict setting, the second posed a situation of a natural 
disaster occurring during ongoing combat operations, while the third concerned 
an epidemic of avian influenza among a mixed population of civilians and 
insurgent forces.  
 
Participants developed the following findings and recommendations: 
 
 Different missions considerably constrain medical and health cooperation 
between armed forces, UN agencies, and NGOs in combat and post-
conflict environments.  
 
 Preferred modes of coordination and information sharing emphasize the 
United Nations via the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA and/or the World Health Organization (WHO), and secondarily 
civilian national agencies such as the USAID Office of US Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (OFDA) as central nodes in the network of humanitarian 
medical and health assistance.  
 
 NGOs vary widely in their willingness to coordinate with armed forces 
under any circumstances.  Furthermore, when international military forces 
are in a belligerent or coercive role the NGO-military relationship is more 
complicated. 
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 Operational coordination is often dependent on relationships built on the 
ground, and is often hindered by policy coordination at higher levels. 
Participants recommended that policy coordination should be driven to a 
much greater degree by operational needs rather than the reverse. 
 
 Mechanisms for operational coordination and information sharing are not 
institutionalized or planned in advance, and actors often re-learn the same 
lessons on the ground in each emergency.  Existing standards and 
protocols appear to be little used. 
 
 The lack of coordination and information sharing is particularly acute 
among and between NGOs and the other communities.  
 
 While planning is underway at the strategic level for intra-governmental 
and international coordination in the event of an avian influenza epidemic 
or pandemic, such planning has yet to impact the operational level. Most 
actors are unaware of what policies and resources are available in the 
various communities. NGOs, as a community and group, are largely 
unprepared for such an event and need to be incorporated into both 
governmental and UN planning. 
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CIVIL-MILITARY MEDICINE:  ON DANGEROUS GROUND 
 
Humanitarian medical and health assistance has traditionally been an arena in 
which foreign and host governments, international organizations (IOs), and 
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) coordinated in response to 
disasters and disease. Increasingly, they have been joined by foreign military 
forces. In the aftermath of the Asian tsunami and the Indo-Pakistani earthquake, 
military and civilian forces responded to provide immediate medical and health 
assistance. Practitioners and scholars alike have noted that the rising incidence 
of civil-military medical and health assistance increases the need for better 
operational coordination and cooperation among the actors in this sector of 
humanitarian assistance (HA).1
 
In light of this growing need, the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Studies (CSRS) at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, 
organized an educational game to focus on the challenges of providing medical 
and health services in environments subject to major natural disasters and 
conflict. The purpose of the game was to allow the various medical communities 
(non-governmental and international organizations, governmental agencies, and 
armed forces) engaged in delivering health services in  emergency situations to 
deepen their mutual understanding of operational planning and implementation. 
Participants from United Nations agencies, the non-governmental humanitarian 
medical community, US civilian government agencies and the US Department of 
Defense medical corps engaged in a four-day educational game designed to 
expand their knowledge of and experience with each other’s organizations and 
missions. The participants brought a wide array of knowledge of procedures and 
protocols as well as field experience in post-conflict situations to the simulations. 
 
The game was specifically geared to focus on operational coordination and 
response to an unfolding humanitarian medical disaster under various 
environmental conditions and security levels. Participants moved through the 
game and learned in concrete detail how each organization’s mission enabled 
and conditioned medical and health responses on the ground. They focused on 
the major challenges humanitarian medical communities face in real-life 
situations as they unfold, from the immediate crisis through its second- and third-
order effects. Participants discussed each others’ organizational priorities, lines 
of authority, and existing mechanisms for cooperation and procedures for 
responding to a complex medical/health emergency.   
 
Participants stressed that the simulation underscored the need for better 
coordination and planning in advance of humanitarian medical and health 
emergencies. There was general agreement that operational networks should be 
constructed to facilitate information sharing and communication among medical 
communities before, during and after complex emergencies occur. They came 
  4 
away with a better understanding of each others’ priorities in different types of 
medical/health emergencies, as well as of who could and should take the lead in 
responding to events.  
 
An important outcome of the game was the sharing of information about each 
community’s mode of operation as well as its operational capabilities. 
Participants discussed the main avenues for intra- and inter-organizational 
communication, the levels at which operational decisions are taken, as well as 
how organizations are likely to respond in a specific situation.  
 
The scenarios successfully revealed which organizations were likely to have a 
particular stake in different types of complex medical and health emergencies.   
Participants also learned how quickly and with what resources each others’ 
organizations could and would respond to a given crisis. They discussed how 
medical and health priorities would shift vis-à-vis other priorities as a crisis 
unfolded over time, and how their relationship with the host nation would evolve. 
 
During the game play, participants explored areas of potential synergy among 
their medical communities. They engaged in discussions of how to integrate 
medical and health assessments and responses, public health information 
campaigns, as well as allocate and request resources. In addition, they focused 
on joint utilization of resources such as laboratory facilities and diagnostic 
equipment, as well as documents and assessment forms. 
 
One of the most fruitful products of the game was the participants’ 
recommendations for their parent organizations. These focused on how to build 
and improve information-sharing mechanisms, such as common assessments. 
Participants emphasized that a common depository of lessons learned and 
evaluation documents should be created. In their view, too many after-action 
reviews were compartmentalized within organizations or governments, and were 
not available for all the medical communities to evaluate and institutionalize the 
many lessons learned in the wake of crises. They emphasized that all of the 
medical/health communities should participate in after-action reviews to ensure 
that integration and coordination spans all the relevant actors. 
 
This report highlights the strengths and weaknesses of each community in 
responding to humanitarian medical crises, as well as the key lessons learned 
during the course of the game. The report follows the chronology of the game. 
Each day, a representative of one of the participating medical/health communities 
introduced their community’s perspective on the issues raised in complex health 
emergencies.  The three papers by Drs. Lawry, Tarantino and Selanikio cover 
these presentations. These are followed in turn by a brief overview of the game 
scenario that followed each presentation, and then a synopsis of the key points 
arising out of participants’ discussions of the simulations.  
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The overall setting of the simulation exercise was the fictional island of Aliya, 
located in the Indian Ocean. Aliya is host to a United Nations peacekeeping 
force, brokering a truce between the government and demobilized former militias. 
A militant faction refuses to disarm, and has struck up ties with other separatist 
movements throughout Southeast Asia. At the request of the Aliyan government, 
the US military has established a joint counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency 
operation with the Aliyan military. Participants in the game played the role of 
medical director within their respective organizations. 
 
 
ALIYA ISLAND – OVERVIEW Thailand 
 
 
Over the three days of game play this background scenario was complicated by a 
series of natural disasters that led to varying levels of insecurity as the 
insurgency took advantage of the crisis situation. The first crisis scenario was 
similar to the Asian tsunami of December 2004. The second involved a disaster 
similar to the Indo-Pakistani earthquake of 2005. The third introduced an 
outbreak of avian influenza and subsequent human-to-human endemic influenza. 
Participants moved through several phases of each crisis, beginning with its 
immediate aftermath, and their response several weeks and then several months 
after the event. At each point in time, participants worked through which unique 
and common problems their organizations would face, what their organizational 
and medical/health priorities would be, as well as how and whether they would 
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PART I. HUMANITARIAN MEDICAL AND HEALTH ASSISTANCE IN 
DISASTER RELIEF 
 
The first section of the game focuses on how medical personnel from NGOs, 
international organizations, civilian government agencies, and the military might 
intersect and interact in the event of a massive catastrophe, similar to the Asian 
tsunami of December 2004. The medical and health problems arising from such 
natural disasters range from immediate treatment to longer-term problems such 
as restoring clinical infrastructure, clean running water and sanitation. The 
humanitarian NGO community plays a central role in provision of all such disaster 
relief. Dr. Lynn Lawry provides a general introduction to the humanitarian 
assistance community. As one participant noted, the humanitarian assistance 
community encompasses a wide variety of organizations which can be roughly 
divided -- according to their views of coordination with the military -- into 
“fundamentalists,” “pragmatists,” and “collaborators.” Dr. Lawry’s chapter 
therefore does not represent the full range of views in the humanitarian 
assistance community, nor does it necessarily represent the views of CSRS. The 
first day’s scenario and a summary of the participants’ discussion and key 
findings follow her chapter.  
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Non-Governmental Humanitarian Aid Perspectives During Health Emergencies 
 




HUMANITARIAN AID PRIORITIES 
 
International non-governmental organizations (INGOs, or simply, NGOs) are an 
essential part of humanitarian relief, bringing years of experience in public health 
and preventive medicine programming to a crisis zone.  In humanitarian 
emergencies, ninety percent of deaths occur from disease rather than armed 
conflict, making INGOs a crucial part of any relief effort.2 Moreover, in a disaster 
INGOs use changing mortality and morbidity rates to monitor and provide 
effective public health programming. Indeed, more than 90% of aid coordinated 
by the United Nations (UN) is provided by INGOs.3
Although INGOs worldwide number in the thousands and vary widely in their 
performance, professionalism, sense of responsibility and attention to standards 
in accordance with the Humanitarian Code of Conduct4, about 95% of the relief 
work is provided by only thirty-five to forty major American and European 
organizations,5 and on the whole, these INGOs follow codified, well-tested 
international standards of care.6   
INGOs are defined by their voluntary, independent, and not-for-profit status and 
have unique charters and missions. They are the major component of the aid 
system that directly represents the recipients in the field, and they vary in size, 
mandate, and capability. Some specialize in broader relief, such as water and 
sanitation, food, health, and shelter. Others focus on targeting specific vulnerable 
groups with appropriate skill sets for, say, therapeutic feeding centers or 
reproductive health. Advocacy INGOs (otherwise known as human rights 
organizations) promote and monitor human rights protections and support efforts 
to uncover and record abuses. Many other humanitarian aid organizations, 
however, also promote and monitor human rights and report on these “silently.”  
Although groups have different mandates and specialties, they all follow key 
principles that guide humanitarian aid, and most of them subscribe to the Code of 
Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and 
INGOs in Disaster Relief.7  
                                                 
* Director, Evidence-Based Research, International Medical Corps, Director, Initiative in Global 
Women’s Health, Brigham and Women’s Hospital/Harvard Medical School. 
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Humanity Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is 
found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable 
in the population, such as children, women and the 
elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be 
respected and protected. 
  
Neutrality Humanitarian assistance must be provided without 
engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies 
of a political, religious or ideological nature. 
  
Impartiality Humanitarian assistance must be provided without 
discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, 
political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the 
suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority 
must be given to the most urgent cases of distress. 
 
Since the attempted genocides in Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia (1992-94), it should 
be noted however, that many organizations have removed “neutrality” statements 
from their charters, as it is impossible to be seen as neutral in any complex 
disaster. By virtue of placing an office or clinic in a specific location, the 
organization will be viewed as being on one side of the “line,” even if the choice 
of location was driven by security concerns or the need to have access to 
affected individuals. Humanitarian aid in more recent years has also become 
more complicated, as aid groups struggle with the perception of locals that the 
groups are a tool of foreign policy. This became especially apparent during the 
Kosovo (1998), Afghanistan (2001-present) and Iraq (2003-present) wars. 
Governments often use "hearts and minds" activities to further foreign policy 
agendas, but these programs do not meet the INGOs’ criteria of neutrality and 
impartiality.  
 
Humanitarian aid agencies vary in their program capacity and may carry out any 
or all of several functions:  Emergency assistance, long-term development, peace 
building and sustainability programming. Key policy and operations are designed 
to:  1) preserve life and minimize suffering by providing warning of natural events 
that often result in disaster (e.g., hurricanes); 2) preserve life and minimize 
suffering by responding to human-generated disasters; 3) foster self-sufficiency 
among disaster-prone nations by helping them achieve some measure of 
preparedness; 4) alleviate suffering by providing rapid, adequate response to aid 
requests; and 5) enhance recovery through rehabilitation programs. While most 
INGOs subscribe to the elimination of extreme poverty, many work as 
development agencies in specific theaters, including post-conflict environments.  
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Assistance activities can be divided into three categories based on the degree of 
contact with the affected population. Direct assistance is face-to-face distribution 
of goods and services. Examples include support of medical clinic services, 
supplies, and personnel. These services can be and usually are long-term. 
Indirect assistance is at least one step removed from the population and involves 
such activities as transporting goods or relief personnel, support for ministries of 
health, and technical assistance such as assessments of hospitals, clinics or 
even population needs and gaps. The third category, infrastructure support, 
involves providing general services, such as road repair, hospital repair, airspace 
management and power generation, which facilitate relief but are not necessarily 
visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population.  
 
Lines of authority 
 
Each humanitarian aid organization is an entity unto itself. Although funding 
sources may be similar (these include the UN; US Agency for International 
Development (USAID); USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Relief; US 
Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration; the 
European Union; and private foundations among many others), each organization 
is independent and answers only to those it aids, its board of directors and its 
donors. There are distinct differences in terms of organizational structure, culture 
and capacity between the various INGOs, but all are often highly effective. 
The United Nations 
In post-conflict environments, humanitarian aid organizations usually look to the 
United Nations for coordination and guidance, although the UN does not have 
any authority over any one NGO.  The UN in recent years has created sub-
divisions within its own organization to aid in relief efforts. The UN Joint Logistics 
Center (UNJLC)8, which comprises all divisions of the UN and the UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
has played a central role in the humanitarian aid community’s relief efforts in 
those countries, and sometimes has served as a liaison to the military for INGOs 
unwilling to speak directly to them.  
 
  
Each humanitarian aid organization is an entity unto itself. 
Although funding sources may be similar, each organization 
is independent and answers only to those they aid, to their 
Boards of Directors, and to their donors. 
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Like INGOs, UN agencies have long in-country time horizons:  They are in place 
before disasters, are there as events unfold, and will be there afterwards. INGOs, 
however, frequently are able to work in conflict areas where the UN cannot 
because of more stringent security rules that govern UN staff and programs. Non-
governmental, non-profit public or voluntary organizations may be admitted into a 
mutually beneficial working relationship with the United Nations by attaining 
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council.9 There are more than 
2,700 INGOs currently that have such status and that may qualify to contribute to 
the work programs and goals of the United Nations by serving as technical 
experts, advisers and consultants to governments and the Secretariat.  
Local Communities 
In any disaster, INGOs make it a priority to obtain community buy-in. Effective 
relief and development activities are implemented through community-based 
programs with participatory project planning approaches. Due to the impartial 
status of INGOs, high-level local government, military, rebel and community 
leader meetings occur on a regular basis. It is not uncommon that INGOs have to 
speak to and negotiate with rebel/regime leaders to get access and aid to IDP 
(internally displaced person) or refugee populations. In general, groups will 
immediately establish relationships with the ministry of health (MoH), and take 
guidance from its officials on how to develop responses. For instance, in some 
countries, reproductive health programs must be modified in order to gain access 
to IDPs. Some countries allow the “morning-after pill” to be used by victims of 
sexual violence; others do not. Nuances are critical when considering which 
procedures are allowed and which MoH medications are accepted.  
 
Although such preliminaries 
can be time-consuming, ING
make a considerable effort to 
meet village elders, “camp 
sheiks” or regime leaders to 
gain access to the communities 
of interest and be more 
effective in their work. It is not 
uncommon to spend a day (or 
more) having tea, and 
introducing the NGO and its 
staff to community leaders. For 
many INGOs, hiring local staff 
and building local capacity is a 
priority in emergency and long-
term program development. 
Staff members who come from 
Os 
IMC’s Lynn Lawry with community leaders in Darfur, 
Sudan (Photo: IMC) 
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the community are familiar with its leaders, customs, language, traditions, and 




Humanitarian organizations are usually present before, during and well after any 
military involvement in a crisis. A key element for humanitarian agencies and 
organizations when they decide to assist affected communities is to establish and 
maintain a conducive operating environment (sometimes referred to as 
“humanitarian space”). Maintaining a clear distinction between humanitarian 
actors and the military is essential to create an operating environment in which 
humanitarian organizations can be effective and stay safe over time.  
 
Maintaining a clear distinction between humanitarian actors 
and the military is essential in creating an operating 
environment in which humanitarian organizations can 
continue to be effective and safe. 
 
Humanitarian space facilitates the perception of adherence to neutrality and 
impartiality.  The military’s sensitivity to issues pertaining to humanitarian space 
is critical for securing good working relationships with INGOs. Sustained access 
to the affected population is ensured when the receipt of aid is not conditional 
upon allegiance to or support of parties in a conflict. Access to humanitarian aid 
must be accepted by all sides as a right, independent of military and political 
action.   
Security 
Humanitarian aid organizations are responsible for their own security, both 
personal and organizational, and cannot work effectively in a dangerous 
environment. Many INGOs take the issue very seriously and have an investment 
in developing security management tools and protocols.  Because they typically 
will remain in theater after the UN has evacuated, the welfare of their staff is 
paramount.  In many countries where there is war or insurgency today, aid 
programs are run from an outside office that communicates with local partners or 
staff inside the conflict area. Many INGOs will stay in areas where the UN may 
not be working; if it appears, however, that the risk of working outweighs the 
benefit of staying, INGOs will evacuate expatriate staff and stop programs that 
may put local staff at risk. Security assessments are made on a daily basis.  
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The provision of security by the military for civilian humanitarian organizations is 
often a contentious issue. Problems of security classification frequently occur 
when INGOs and the military seek to share reporting.   
 
Organizations develop their own security protocols that range from armed guards 
outside offices and houses, to an absolute policy against having any type of arms 
on organizational property, including cars. In recent years, as INGOs have 
become targets of violence themselves, there has been a noticeable increase not 
only in better security for in-country offices, but also in the hiring of security 
consultants and organization staff who have had prior military experience.  
 
 
An IMC security convoy in Darfur, Sudan (Photo: IMC) 
 
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, there were instances where civilian humanitarian 
aid had to be delivered with the assistance of military security or in coordination 
with military convoys.  In early April 2003, International Medical Corps (IMC) had 
to be attached to a Marine division for security in order to get needed supplies to 
hospitals in the An Nasyriah area of Iraq, as well as make adequate assessments 
of other clinics and hospitals. In fact, the area was so insecure at the time that 
IMC staff camped at a Marine prison site, Camp Whitehorse, during these 
assessments, using IMC supplies but relying on the military encampment for 
security at night.  Despite their efforts, however, looting of hospitals and the 
complete lack of security during and after combat in Iraq hindered supply and 
stability in the hospitals and wasted precious resources. Chronically, INGOs 
found they did not have the money needed to supply hospitals and clinics. The 
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disagreement over whether the United States was an “occupying force” and 
therefore needed to uphold the Geneva Conventions, left a void in security for 
hospitals and clinics that had a significant effect on the ability of local health 




Humanitarian aid organizations use all available modes of communication -- cell 
phones, satellite, internet, and peer-to-peer technology -- and in most cases are 
up and running with communications when they cross the border. In some 
instances, security prohibits use of cell phones or other communication 
modalities, leaving face-to-face communication as a necessary means to achieve 
goals. This is frequently the case when organizations need to discuss human 
rights violations. In dealing with the military, it may be more beneficial to work via  
 
International Non-Governmental Organizations vary from 
group to group as to whether communication with the 
military, in any form, is desirable. Technology cannot 
substitute for personal interaction; you must get people 
together and build trust across organizational boundaries. 
 
a peer-to-peer network (or web-based information sharing); there are times when 
face-to-face communication promotes trust that could not be achieved otherwise. 
INGOs vary from group to group as to whether they consider communication with 
the military, in any form, to be desirable. Technology cannot substitute for 
personal interaction; people must get together and build trust between 
organizations. Open networks can be protected, and protected communications 
can bridge organizational boundaries as well as the civil-military divide. Peer-to-
peer networks between the military and INGOs are being used now in 
Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq and many other countries. To this day, much of the 
existing civil-military cooperation and coordination is based on personal trust and 




Coordination is important in all stages of the aid process. Many INGOs believe 
that communication and coordination should start at the pre-conflict stage.  The 
goal of coordination and communication is to avoid duplication of efforts or 
establishment of parallel programs. In the medical realm, the creation of parallel 
health systems within a country has to be avoided. INGOs do not set up field 
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hospitals or otherwise subvert the local health care system; rather, INGOs will, 
when possible, help to renovate existing clinics or hospitals. Parallel programs 
cause confusion for the people they intend to help and set up unrealistic goals for 
the community and its leaders. It is far more desirable to work together using the 
strengths of all groups and existing infrastructure to accomplish a goal.  
 
The UN Secretariat may instruct one UN agency to act as the lead agency or to 
direct the overall response for a particular sector. Usually this is OCHA. Since its 
creation, OCHA has taken on the role of coordinator of humanitarian response, 
policy development and humanitarian advocacy. OCHA typically becomes 
involved in the initial response only when and if a crisis reaches such proportions 
that it requires a multi-sectoral international effort broken down into clusters such 
as health, food, protection, etc.10 OCHA usually will establish a humanitarian 
operations center (HOC) to facilitate and support coordination among 
humanitarian organizations. The HOC provides a common facility where 
organizations and agencies can work together on mutual issues, pooling the 
experience and expertise of the respective humanitarian groups for immediate 
and effective responses.  
 
Since its establishment, the United Nations Office of the 
Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs has taken on the role of 
coordination of humanitarian response, policy development 
and humanitarian advocacy. 
 
The OCHA representative may authorize the establishment of a Humanitarian 
Information Center (HIC), an interagency center for UN agencies, INGOs, and 
donor entities that serves as a hub for integration, information and data. The HIC 
provides coordination tools, reference sites for maps, de-mining maps and 
sectoral meeting schedules, and delineates tasks and locations for personnel, 
among other services.  
Some INGOs have particular knowledge and skills in one or more of the essential 
“sectors” and will only undertake projects based on requirements within that 
sector. Typical sector groupings are:  Food; water and sanitation; shelter; public 
health and medical; human rights/protection; education; agriculture; gender 
issues; de-mining. One NGO, for instance, may take responsibility to see that 
adequate housing is available across the entire operational area (Kosovo and 
Iraq are good examples, in which the country was subdivided into regions where 
one NGO would take the lead on all efforts in a particular sector), requiring 
INGOs to coordinate with each other and with the military.    
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There have been other successful information/coordination centers in 
Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Indonesia. An HOC, also called a civil-military 
operations center, run by the US military, was indispensable in Kuwait during the 
2003 Iraq war.11 Although coordination met with resistance from INGOs in the 
early stages of the war, ultimately more than eighty INGOs, the UN and the 
military met within this center and worked together. Having a neutral and media-
free space for close interaction and discussion allowed civil and military actors to 
consult without having to fight the issues of ownership and control. At the HOC-
Kuwait, humanitarian information was collected and shared by all groups. It is 
interesting to note that the vast preponderance of cooperation and collaboration 
occurred informally over coffee after daily briefings. Lessons learned from this 
positive experience have been invaluable in easing the often contentious civil-
military relationship. Themes that recurred in each civil-military interaction over 
the years are notable, and include simply agreeing on common definitions of 
important terms, and to avoid acronyms and irritant phrases.12 For example, 
INGOs agreed to avoid using the term “belligerent,” and the military agreed not to 
call INGOs “force multipliers.”   
 
 
INGOs understand that the military, in accordance with the 
Geneva Conventions, should provide treatment to 
combatants but not necessarily to civilians, and that military 
hospitals are established to treat combat-wounded soldiers 
and combatants rather than for civilians to receive treatment. 
 
The military and INGOs nevertheless should not assume that each understands 
the other, as cultural differences can be subtle, yet profound. Within medical 
ethics, there are distinct and characteristic “lines in the sand” that can determine 
how the military or an NGO may respond on the ground. INGOs understand that 
the military, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, should provide 
treatment to combatants but not necessarily to civilians, and that military 
hospitals are established to treat combat-wounded soldiers and combatants 
rather than for civilians to receive treatment. Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq saw 
military hospitals flooded by civilians seeking care. At the same time, INGOs are 
flooded with members of local host communities (some whom may be 
“combatants,” such as Hutu militia in Rwanda) requesting care in refugee and 
IDP camps. Under such circumstances, INGOs have decided that care must be 
given to all. Efforts have been made not only to assist in refugee camps, but also 
in local communities that may be hosting millions of refugees.  
 
It therefore falls on INGOs to:  1) Educate the community and the military that 
parallel health systems undermine local capacity (as discussed above); 2) assist 
local leaders to identify needs of area hospitals and clinics so that populations 
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can be served; and 3) ask for and use military specialized surgical teams only in 
the most dire circumstances, when a need cannot be met at the civilian level.  An 
example of the latter occurred during the Kosovo campaign, when a French field 
hospital in Albania was asked to care for a Kosovar child with acute appendicitis. 
The child was operated on in the field hospital and sent back to the refugee camp 




Daily briefs in any venue (UN, military, NGO) need to include all major 
stakeholders and should cover all that are relevant among the following topics:  
Food; logistics and transportation; social services; domestic needs; health and 
nutrition; water and sanitation; education; shelter; income generation; 
environmental protection; mine and unexploded ordinance data; agency 
operational support; public information; budgets; and safety and protection. All 
agencies in this setting should have a chance to share concerns or brief others 
on situations they have encountered. 
 
 
Shared assessments among military and NGO groups have 
been difficult. These attempts have only emphasized the 




An interesting and complex topic is the need for good epidemiologic information. 
Many groups “collect data,” although very few have evidence-based methods for 
understanding needs, deaths, epidemics and gaps at a population-based level. 
IMC is one of a handful of INGOs that uses epidemiologic, population-based data 
collection. In many cases the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
because it is a government organization, cannot access areas in need. It then 
becomes the responsibility of INGOs (many of whom do not have the technical 
expertise) to collect data and report on many different levels of need.  It is nearly 
impossible, for example, for any NGO to have Polymerase Chain Reaction labs 
established in the field to identify specific strains of infections.   
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Military and NGO groups have found it difficult to share assessments. In Iraq, the 
US military's Civil Affairs assessments of forward cities were impossible to 
declassify, despite numerous attempts by HOC personnel. In addition, the form 
that was created by UN and US governmental agencies for such assessments 
was described as a “nightmare.” There have been several attempts to simplify 
this form and make it accessible on peer-to-peer networks so that any 
organization (civilian or military) can access it and use the data as necessary. 
These attempts have only emphasized the problem of communication and 




The media play an important role in disseminating information, including 
information about NGO relief efforts. But the media have unique requirements for 
fulfilling their role that often don’t benefit INGOs on the ground. The HOC-Kuwait 
had a “no media” policy. Reporters were not allowed on the compound and all 
interviews were conducted off-site, a valuable decision that allowed the military 
and INGOs to interact closely in an environment free from political visibility and 
without risk to neutrality or of mandate violation.  The trust thus established 
allowed the HOC to coordinate with INGOs that routinely keep their distance from 
the military.  This promoted the rapid sharing of vital, non-classified information 
and helped get non-military aid to areas of critical need.   
 
 
INGOs must balance the risk publicity can pose to their 
coordination efforts and to their beneficiaries against the 
simultaneous need to raise visibility and receive public 
recognition.   
 
 
INGOs, however, must balance the benefits noted above with the simultaneous 
need to raise visibility and receive public recognition for their efforts.  While this 
may not appear congruent with being an organization providing relief in a 
humanitarian crisis, it reflects the reality that governments, as well as private 
donors and foundations, fund INGOs. Organizations must show results to their 
constituencies, or their funding streams will suffer.    
In other cases, the media can inadvertently put INGOs or their beneficiaries at 
risk.  Although heightened public awareness can foster changes in policy or help 
INGOs to raise more money to further serve human needs, it can also hurt their 
programs. This was especially true for American INGOs in Iraq. In the case of 
IMC, media reports related to IMC operations in Iraq have been kept at a bare 
minimum in order to ensure the safety of staff and programs. Without IMC’s 
programs, more than six million beneficiaries would not have access to aid. IMC 
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also experienced situations in which political conditions and cultural sensitivities 
made it unwise to release data collected through evidence-based research, or 
even information about a program.  
 
In a similar vein, there have been situations in which IMC has initiated studies 
that could not be completed; changed the research design to account for risks 
and political events; and even withheld scientific work from publication to protect 
staff, data collectors and participants. Although it is ideal to have one’s work 
published in peer-reviewed journals, and thereby accepted as credible scientific 
work, it is transparently more important to protect participants and in-country 
collaborators. Sometimes quiet diplomacy accomplishes as much as media 
releases, and with less risk to staff, than the so-called “name and shame” 
approach common to many human rights investigations.  All of these factors must 
be considered when deciding how to use information. 
 
Supplies and Logistics 
 
Humanitarian aid workers cannot subvert country policies and laws and remain 
effective. In general, they must adhere to visa, health, identification, and 
documentation requirements. In some cases, this is done from the country of 
origin, such as the United States; in others, it may be that visas are obtained “on 
the tarmac,” as was the case in Afghanistan during the Taliban years and during 
the early stages of the 2001-02 war there, before the interim government was 
established. Multi-entry business visas are essential, as are other transit visas to 
countries where INGO workers may need to travel for safety reasons. In some 
countries (such as Iraq), border passes and checkpoint passes are needed. In 
Sudan, travel documents are needed simply to travel from Khartoum to Darfur, 
and again upon return. 
This can take days to 
expedite and the “fees” 
associated with such 
paperwork can be high. 
  
Humanitarian aid 
agencies usually must 
register with the country 
where they are providing 
assistance, which can 
take days or even weeks, 
depending on the 
country. In addition, the






Air transport in Afghanistan (Photo: IMC)
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transportation, support staff and translators are all arranged once office space is 
found and secured. In some cases, programs have been run from tents until 
office space and/or security could be assured. Travel throughout the country, if 
possible, is done by road, sometimes using old tourist maps as opposed to GPS.  
  
Humanitarian assistance groups can use air transport for supplies or personnel. 
Specific INGOs work in this area. AirServ is the most popular for humanitarian aid 
workers.13 Its flights are cheaper than UN flights, and it is easier to arrange seats. 
Only in extreme circumstances does AirServ ground flights, and its planes fly into 
some of the most remote areas. On occasion, humanitarian aid supplies and 
personnel have flown on military planes, but usually it is only when no other 
options exist. In other cases, it is possible for INGOs to have enough clout with 
the host community to arrange transport on helicopters, trucks or even trains (as 
happened in Albania) for supplies, personnel or even medical evacuation. Some 
INGOs relied on military transport for supplies and personnel from Kuwait into 
and out of Iraq, especially at times when the cross-border roads became “non-
permissive.” In Afghanistan, flights into Dubai could be coordinated with Baghram 
Airbase during the war, when normal means of transportation (commercial flights 
in and out of Pakistan and UN flights) were unavailable. The Northern Alliance 
also ferried NGO personnel into areas that were inaccessible by road or other 
means, especially during the winter months.  
  
Humanitarian aid agencies are generally “logistics poor.” Transport, warehousing, 
procurement and communications, which are military strengths, are not, for the 
most part, strengths for INGOs. Waybills for cargo, as well as import taxes, export 
taxes, airport fees, etc., require patience and time. It is not uncommon for 
vehicles or other expensive equipment (communications and medical) to be held 
up in customs.  
  
The movement of personnel, materiel, and frequently, food continues to present 
serious difficulties for many agencies, especially in conflict areas. Delays or lack 
of knowledge of custom clearance procedures and uncertainties related to 
stockpile availability compounds these issues for INGOs.  
 
Military Assistance  
 
Humanitarian assistance providers look to the military as a last resort and prefer 
that any use of military assets retain its civilian nature and character. While 
INGOs understand that military assets are under military control, the operation as 
a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of civilian 
humanitarian authorities. Military support for humanitarian work should not 
involve direct assistance, in order to maintain a clear distinction between the 
normal functions and roles of civilian and military stakeholders. 
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It is important for the NGO community to avoid making distinctions between 
“good guys” and “bad guys;” aid workers must remain impartial, since neutrality is 
always at risk. It is certainly more difficult to coordinate with those who are party 
to the conflict (for example, the US military in Iraq 2003), but that is not to say that 
bridges cannot be built. For some INGOs, the overriding principle is getting to 
those in need at all costs. If this means talking to or even negotiating with rebels 
such as Kabila in Zaire, rebels in Sierra Leone, or the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
some (but not many) INGOs will find a way to do this in order to get access to 




This conclusion summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of humanitarian aid 
organizations, and the challenges they face and create in carrying out their work.  
 




INGOs have access usually before a disaster, stay 
during the disaster/conflict, and remain long after.  
  
Inexpensive INGOs have the capability to transport goods across 
countries and continents at a cheaper rate. The UN 
and INGOs can lease C-130s and helicopters better 
than the military in the long-term (in the short-term of 




INGOs have years of experience in public health and 
preventive medicine programming which is important 
given that 90% of deaths occur due to disease as 
opposed to conflict.14  
  
Development INGOs have years of experience in not just emergency 
response but in the area of long-term development 
and reconstruction. Lessons learned for more than 40 
years have helped to determine what works in conflict 
and non-conflict areas.   
  
Partnerships INGOs work with local partners and have community 
buy-in. There is little suspicion of INGOs regarding US 
agenda. INGOs work with the communities to decide 
what the priorities of the community are and how to 
best empower the local community to eventually 
“take-over” the projects started by INGOs.  
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There likely will be numerous INGOs involved in any 
one disaster. While grouped under one heading, all 
organizations vary widely in terms of size, orientation, 
funding sources, etc.  Working together is difficult.  
Each NGO is primarily concerned with fulfilling its own 
purpose and gaining visibility and recognition for its 




Coordination among INGOs poses a challenge.  INGOs 
may have an organization-centric bias and are 
reluctant to accept assessments from other 
organizations as a basis for committing assets.   
  
Informal INGOs also tend to rely on ad hoc procedures and 
networks, including personal networks, as opposed to 
formalized procedures and relationships - although as 
stated previously there are written standards and 
guidelines that INGOs follow, especially in health 




INGOs may knowingly or unknowingly exaggerate 
conditions or inflate requirements in order to gain 





INGOs as a whole lack the technical capacity to have 
evidence-based assessments. Numbers that are 
quoted by INGOs tend to be “best guess” methods, 
which in many cases leads to either under-recognition 





INGOs do not have a network of laboratories or 
collective lab capabilities for assessing epidemics. 
  
Staffing Organizations are largely relying on full-time or part-
time professional staff, and approximately 24% of 
staff is volunteers. In addition, it is difficult to find 
people willing to travel, regardless of geographic 
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Communications Reaching coastline and small islands in real time (if 
there are not on-going program aid programs 




Most of the emergency teams are able to deploy 
within 72 hours, but primarily for assessment 
missions. Only a few agencies are able to react within 
24 hours, despite the fact that most agencies have a 
24-hour on-call system.16
  
Logistics The movement of personnel, material, and frequently 
food continues to present serious difficulties for many 
agencies. Security in a particular area is the most 
cumbersome roadblock for INGOs. Delays or lack of 
knowledge of custom clearance procedures and 
uncertainties related to stockpile availability 
compounds these issues. 
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Scenario 1: Responding to a Earthquake and Tsunami 
 
The first scenario takes place against the backdrop of ongoing peacekeeping and 
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations, and post-conflict 
reconstruction of the society and economy. Under such conditions, humanitarian 
organizations are providing aid in most sectors (e.g., water and sanitation, health, 
agriculture, economic development) but are limited in their access to the highland 
populations, where remnants of the militant rebels still operate. The United 
Nations peacekeeping forces continue to monitor the peace agreement between 
demobilized and disarmed former militias and Aliyan government forces. 
Government and US forces are conducting counter-insurgency operations in a 
significant portion of the island to counter the activities of the remaining rebels, 
and other agencies and organization have only restricted access to these areas.  
During the course of the simulation, participants were presented with a series of 
four parts as the crisis unfolded over time. The participants were broken into 
three groups to work through the parts of the scenario. 
 
Scenario 1, Part 1: The Immediate Aftermath 
 
The first part of the scenario takes place two days after two massive earthquakes 
in the Indian Ocean unleashed a tsunami on the island. Participants, acting as 
medical directors for their respective organizations and agencies on the ground, 
were asked to focus on information gathering, inter-agency coordination, 
information dissemination to local staff and parent organizations, as well as the 
main avenues for intra-agency and inter-agency communication.  
 
Participants were uniform in stating that their priority in the immediate aftermath 
of such a catastrophe would be the health and wellbeing of their own personnel. 
Only after communications and assessments of their own staff had been 
undertaken and their medical needs met, would the medical communities focus 
on assessing the broader damage to the local population and infrastructure. For 
the NGO community, identifying the number of dead and injured among its local 
and expatriate staff, contacting local staff throughout the country and getting 
information on their availability for work was the first priority. As one participant 
noted, “if my staff are tracking down missing relatives and helping their families, 
they won’t show up to work.” NGOs also would need to evaluate the possibilities 
for evacuation of expatriate staff. For the military, the first concern would be the 
health and safety of their own forces, both in the capital city and at the main Joint 
Task Force base in the south. Their assessments would focus on potential further 
risks to troops, and what additional medical care and supplies are needed to 
respond to new disasters befalling their forces. For the embassy medical officer, 
the first task would likewise be to establish the status of embassy expatriate and 
local personnel.  
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Each community would begin with such an “inward” assessment and then focus 
on assessing the overall impact of the tsunami, as well as what resources and 
personnel are available to provide medical aid and disaster relief. The bulk of 
initial communication and information sharing would occur in person, consuming 
significant time and resources for many of the participants. For the military, the 
second priority would be an assessment of the impact of the catastrophe on their 
mission. They would be seeking information on the scale of the disaster, as well 
as direction from their superiors about whether the Joint Task Force (JTF) would 
have its missions curtailed or reduced and switched to a new mission of 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). Some suggested that a new 
JTF would be established nearer the capital with an HA/DR mission. 
 
For the embassy medical officer, the first point of contact would be the local 
Ministry of Health to find out what it knew about conditions throughout the 
country, and what resources existed for search and rescue. All this would be 
supplied to the ambassador so that he could coordinate the potential medical 
activities of the agencies, such as USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. 
The medical officer would also seek to facilitate the public health and medical 
activities of a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART).  
 
The UN would also undertake an assessment of its staff, but would then work to 
measure the amount of “human damage” done – which populations were affected 
and to what degree – as well as the amount of physical damage:   the extent of 
flooding, and  of damage and destruction to houses and infrastructure. World 
Health Organization staff would seek information from NGOs about where they 
are providing services and where gaps in provision exist. The UN humanitarian 
coordinator would be the focal point for coordination within the UN system, and 
between the UN and NGOs. This person would set up meetings and mobilize UN 
Disaster and Coordination (DAC) and Search and 
Rescue (SAR) teams.  
 
The NGO, IO and foreign government participants 
agreed that getting information on the number of 
dead and injured throughout the country would be 
the second priority, and that efforts would be made 
immediately to set up coordination and 
communication centers. There was disagreement 
over whether the foreign military forces should be 
directly represented at such a coordination and 
communication center. Some participants said t
would want to meet with any organization, 
including the military. The military would have 
information on security risks to NGO personnel as well as the capability for 
assessing infrastructural damage. They would visit the Ministry of Health daily to 
hey 
Japanese DART team in Banda 
Aceh after the Asian Tsunami (Photo: 
REUTERS/Kim Kyung- Hoon, courtesy 
of Alertnet) 
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report on their findings, even if the Ministry had no information itself. Some 
participants rejected the idea of communicating and coordinating directly with 
military forces, particularly foreign military forces. This would occur only as a last 
resort, and such communication should be channeled through the embassy and 
ministries. Their first point of contact would be the United Nations. Participants 
suggested that the local UN Office of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) or the US 
Embassy – if functional – should act as the coordinating mechanism for disaster 
response. All participants acknowledged that this coordinating mechanism would 
be officially led by the local government’s Ministry of Health; since it was likely 
that “the government had collapsed at this point,” however, most recognized that 
the primary coordination would fall to the UN or an acceptable embassy.  
 
While all participants agreed that an integrated assessment center that included 
the local Ministry of Health, the local Red Cross or Red Crescent Society, the UN 
agencies, NGOs and the embassies (representing the foreign military forces) 
should ideally be established, some of them questioned whether this would 
actually be the primary means of communicating and coordinating. For some 
NGOs, a key factor was identifying which coordinating meetings were the most 
important to attend, as too much staff time would be wasted shuttling from 
meeting to meeting. NGOs would seek to identify who in embassies could be a 
source for communication, who had the most information, and with whom they 
would be able to communicate. They would seek to find the “center of gravity” for 
coordination and communication, and would not waste time on other meetings of 




(Photo: US Navy/Philip A. McDaniel) 
 
matran village after the Asian Tsunam
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For NGOs, much of the key information needed at this stage of the response 
involved their ability to bring in and distribute resources. For them, key questions 
included whether the local government would allow needed staff and supplies to 
be brought into the country, and whether they would have access to airfields, 
roads, storage facilities, housing and shelter for their workers. The other 
information required by NGOs included finding out where the internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) and other populations at risk were, what their health status was 
and whether they had shelter.  The NGO medical director would also be 
concerned with identifying sources of funding locally as well as internationally, 
and establishing communication means both in-country and with headquarters. 
 
The military noted that their ability to move beyond force protection measures 
would depend on guidance from their government as well as the conditions that 
are attached to funds that are made available for response. If authorized to 
provide humanitarian assistance, the civil affairs officer would be responsible for 
contacting the host nation and the US embassy to determine needs and potential 
contributions. 
 
Participants noted that one of the key lessons from the Asian tsunami was the 
need for medical directors to restrain their own humanitarian impulses. The 
temptation of operational staff is immediately to begin providing direct relief – 
loading trucks with medical supplies – instead of focusing on assessing needs 
and capabilities, and coordinating locally and communicating with headquarters. 
One group of participants enthusiastically supported the idea of setting up a local 
radio station to broadcast situation reports and updates among the humanitarian 
communities. The military participants in this group suggested that they would 
have the capacity to set up such a station.  
 
Participants agreed that ideally the following actions should be taken. A 
communication and coordination infrastructure or network would be established, 
with the UN OCHA or an embassy as the coordinator. Some participants noted 
that whichever agency provided a daily situation report to all communities would 
become the de facto coordinator. All agreed that on the need for standardized 
and regular information updates. Some recommended that a medical officer 
should run lower-level operational coordination, to ensure someone with 
technical skills is in charge of health and medical matters. The primary tasks after 
internal assessments would be to find out who has information, what relief efforts 
are being undertaken and to shift resources within the country to meet needs. 
Essential information includes determining who is under dire threat and whether 
there are immediate rescue needs; what the status of food, water and sanitation, 
and shelter are; what infrastructure exists to provide healthcare; and where 
people are moving to. Ideally, assessments would be coordinated, with different 
NGOs and teams dividing their labor in a complementary fashion, taking on 
particular portions of the affected areas as well as particular functional tasks 
(e.g., health, water and sanitation, rescue operations). The coordinating center 
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would provide information to USAID OFDA and other potential donors to aid in 
filling identified needs.  
 
Others noted that all agencies and organizations should have contingency plans 
for all relevant potential disasters such as an earthquake, and would have 
coordinated their response in advance, but that this planning function often has 
not occurred in reality.  
 
Despite agreement on the need for coordination, one break-out group made clear 
that most agency representatives wanted their own agency to take the lead. UN 
representatives were adamant on a UN lead. Other representatives noted that 
regardless of orders, military commanders balk at the UN taking the lead. Despite 
legal requirements, this break-out group agreed that decision makers on the 
ground tend to think of themselves as decisive, and while this often subverts 
plans, it also can lead to much beneficial (if ad hoc) cooperation. 
 
Scenario 1, Part 2: Initial Reports of Cholera  
 
The second part of the first day’s scenario is set three weeks after the 
earthquakes and tsunami have hit the island country of Aliya.  Government 
estimates are 94,000 killed and 476,700 displaced. Currently living in 
overcrowded camps with little access to basic services, the tsunami victims are 
increasingly vulnerable to disease. A spokesperson for one of the large aid 
organizations has reported that a doctor diagnosed four cases of cholera in one 
of the displaced camps. The director of the only functioning hospital near the 
devastated area denies any suspected outbreak. It is known that people in the 
camps are dying but the reports conflict as to what the cause of death is. Given 
the proximity of the camps to each other and free movement between the camps, 
the possibility that a cholera epidemic could erupt in a matter of days is extremely 
high.  
Participants were asked to focus on how their organizations would respond to this 
initial report of a cholera outbreak and what sources of information about the 
health situation they would trust. They were asked how they would put together a 
rapid verification and response team, and who could and should lead such an 
effort. 
When asked about their immediate response, most of the NGOs agreed that they 
would immediately begin ramping up a cholera response effort before the initial 
reports of cholera had been confirmed. At a minimum they would begin public 
education campaigns on how to prevent the spread of the disease. They would 
determine whether WHO cholera kits were already in the country, and if not, 
would notify WHO and the local Ministry of Health of the reports and request 
them. They would then recommend training staff on such things as the logistics of 
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setting up cholera tents properly, and how to protect against contracting the 
disease through personal hygiene, safe water and food selection and 
preparation.  
The NGO and military participants discussed the possibility of coordinating public 
education campaigns to combat the cholera outbreak.  While they have 
significant numbers of local employees fluent in the various local languages and 
dialects, one NGO participant asserted that in the field most NGOs lack the 
capacity to print brochures or other educational materials on a large scale. 
Military participants stated that they have significant printing capabilities, and 
participants from both communities agreed that this is an important area in which 
there is a great potential for collaboration.   
All participants agreed on the need to assess the situation and take preventive 
measures for their own personnel and the broader population. The UN would also 
operate on the assumption that the cholera was the cause of the symptoms, 
though it would work with the Ministry of Health to verify the reports. The UN 
representatives emphasized that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and/or Civil 
Defense also would be involved, to deal with issues of quarantine. The embassy 
medical officers stressed that the situation immediately raises political as well as 
health issues. The health issues are the easiest to manage, as fairly standardized 
protocols for dealing with a suspected outbreak of cholera exist. The embassy 
would ask WHO would work with the local Ministry of Health to confirm the 
diagnosis. The military would immediately focus on force protection and 
education to prevent contraction and spread of the disease. Military 
representatives asked why local staff and logistics are not prepared in advance of 
such predictable events. The same sequence of events seems to happen in each 
disaster, yet plans are not in place in advance. A NGO representative replied that 
many American NGOs are constrained by their lack of funding for advance 
preparation. Funds only arrive when a disaster strikes, not before.  
When asked about which sources of information they would rely on, the 
participants diverged. Most agreed that “nobody really trusts anybody else in a 
disaster.… Everyone feels that they must do their own assessments, or do not 
want to wait for the assessments of others.” Some favored relying on the NGO 
field testers – if they are a credible NGO – while others said that local doctors are 
more reliable in their diagnoses than expatriate doctors. Most agreed that they 
would want a confirmation of the initial diagnosis. Some felt it would be sufficient 
to rely on the Ministry of Health’s laboratories, if it has the capability to conduct 
tests according to internationally accepted standards, while others wanted an 
international (either WHO or US military) lab to verify as well. Most would 
undertake their own assessments of the outbreak. 
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Most agreed that the formation of rapid verification and response teams should 
be led by the Ministry of Health; furthermore, they should be joint international 
teams, to conduct assessments and collect samples, and implement the 
appropriate protocols. The question of the involvement of foreign military forces 
elicited significant discussion. Some participants from NGOs and UN agencies 
insisted that such teams would be non-military to prevent locals and staff from 
being associated with parties to the ongoing conflict. Only in the event of an 
insecure environment would a military escort be welcomed by the UN. The US 
military might put together its own response team, as these tend to be custom-
fashioned. It would include US public health officials in addition to military 
medical doctors. A consensus seemed to be that the use of US military forces 
would depend on the presence of host nation military forces or rebel units. There 
was considerable disagreement as to whether US military medical corps 
personnel could travel in relief missions without armed escorts and armed 
vehicles.  
 
When discussing the question of which agency could and should lead such an 
operation, the respondents agreed that a joint assessment team would prevent 
“assessment fatigue” on the part of the local Ministry of Health. The question of 
which agency should lead the team produced different perspectives. Some 
military participants noted that in some situations, the military would have to take 
the lead. Most participants agreed that the Ministry of Health would lead the work, 
with close support from WHO. One group argued against an MOH lead, however, 
because according to the scenario, the Ministry of Health was headed by 
someone from the area where the insurgency was fiercest; in this case, WHO 
would be a more neutral entity with greater credibility and access to the affected 
population.  
 
Scenario 1, Part 3: Cholera Epidemic and Internally Displaced 
Persons  
Part 3 takes place six weeks after the tsunami. Humanitarian workers are calling 
for increased security in IDP Camp C due to fighting in the area. In addition, a 
cholera epidemic has been declared in the camp. It is felt that the epidemic can 
be contained if people remain in Camp C, where they have access to medical 
treatment; however, growing insecurity from incidents between the separatist 
movement and government troops is convincing people to leave the camp and 
surrounding area, thereby spreading the disease. UN peacekeepers are getting 
pressure from the local population and international aid workers to assist in 
keeping the people in the camps, and to provide general security in the area. The 
displaced are leaving Camp C out of fear that the separatists will attack the 
camp. They are also fleeing harassment by the government troops sent to guard 
the camp. The Aliyan troops have limited logistical support and are thus being 
aggressive toward the very population they were sent to protect.  
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Humanitarian doctors have confirmed 54 cases of cholera in Camp C, with the 
number significantly increasing as each day passes. Other cases are now being 
reported in Camps A and B, most likely spread by those fleeing the growing 
insecurity in the Camp C area. 15 deaths have been recorded. There are an 
estimated 35,000 people being sheltered in the Camps A and B. Towns 
surrounding the camp are home to over 100,000 people. Isolated reports in other 
parts of the country indicate deaths resembling cholera, and samples have been 
sent to the capitol for confirmation. Given the scarcity of medical personnel and 
supplies in rural areas, people have begun moving into the urban centers. This 
may be the beginning of a mass migration into urban centers. The Ministry of 
Health has very little in the way of surplus staff, medications or lab facilities to 
help control the epidemic, and no resources to prevent the migration. The cholera 
epidemic is spreading rapidly and can no longer be considered under control.  
Participants were asked to identify their primary and secondary priorities for 
responding to the cholera outbreak, and to consider any time constraints on 
these activities. They were asked to specify the level at which operational health 
decisions in their organization are made, and the amount of time delay they 
expected after an incident until that level is reached. Another topic of discussion 
was whether participants felt the need to establish their own laboratory. If 
participants planned on using others agencies’ and organizations’ labs, they were 
asked to identify which ones they would feel comfortable using, and who would 
and would not have access to them. Participants were asked how they defined 
the concept “control the environment,” and with whom and how coordination 
should be organized and led. They were also asked to play the role of advocate 
on the JTF staff, and to consider how to convince the JTF commander to 
authorize the use of military resources for direct assistance.  
 
With regard to organizations’ priorities, all participants agreed that an immediate 
public information campaign was a very high priority, despite the reality that such 
campaigns often did not receive enough attention or begin quickly enough. 
However, they diverged on whether the security situation or the medical 
emergency was the primary issue at stake. For the UN and military, the security 
situation took precedence as it related to preventing the spread of the outbreak. 
For the embassy medical officers and NGOs, controlling the outbreak in the 
camps was the first priority.   
 
The UN representatives in general believed that the security situation took 
precedence, and that preventing the camps’ inhabitants from being attacked or 
harassed was the key to preventing the spread of disease. The UN Special 
Representative to the Secretary General would press the host government to 
improve security at the camp and train its staff not to harass the IDPs. If this 
failed, the UN would seek to work with local police chiefs to improve the situation. 
The secondary priority would be to get UNHCR UNICEF or NGO personnel into 
the camps to handle the cholera. The UN participants emphasized that the UN 
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would seek to increase the services provided in the camps, such as immunization 
and medical services. The UN agencies would seek to minimize their presence in 
the camps, and would not allow UN peacekeepers inside the camps. They would 
prefer to rely on NGOs to manage the disease and water and sanitation issues.  
 
The military, embassy and UN participants all agreed that security – and who 
would provide it – was a priority. The question of quarantining the camps was 
raised. One UN official noted that if people in the camps decide to move, only the 
host government can order a quarantine. UN and other agencies cannot hold the 
people in the camps against their will. The military representatives all agreed that 
their first priority would be to report the information to headquarters, and to 
protect the health of their troops. The military would also seek to coordinate 
security measures with host government forces in the area. Some military 
officials suggested that the military might be able to provide assistance with water 
and sanitation in the camps.  The secondary priority would be to develop a plan 
to support the work of NGOs and the host nation to manage the outbreak and 
improve security, while awaiting authorization from headquarters. Some military 
officials rejected the notion that NGOs would remain in the camps or even on the 
island, because of security threats. NGO participants maintained that they would 
stay even if the military is fighting with insurgents because their mission 
continues despite - and because of - lack of security.  
 
The NGOs said their first priorities would be to treat current cholera cases, which 
entails bringing in adequate supplies and personnel. The secondary priority 
would be to improve water and sanitation in the camps, in order to prevent future 
cases. The third priority would be preventive measures to protect their staff both 
from disease and from possible attacks. In short, preventing the migration of the 
disease would not be their main concern. Both the UN and NGOs agreed that 
they would try to improve conditions in the camps to manage the outbreak, but 
also to provide incentives for the IDPs not to leave the camp. The participants 
playing the role of US embassy medical officers noted that their first priority would 
be to provide sanitary water services and care for acute patients, and to assess 
and report to their superiors why their efforts to prevent the cholera outbreak had 
failed. The secondary priority was to stay alert to the possibility of other disease 
outbreaks within the same population.   
 
All participants agreed that decisions would be made at the local operational 
level. In circumstances such as this particular scenario, sufficient funding would 
be immediately available to implement decisions locally, without the need to go to 
headquarters. This was true across the board, from NGOs to the military. 
 
With regard to laboratory facilities, participants agreed that the best choice was to 
help rebuild the capacity of Ministry of Health laboratories to allow them to 
produce credible results. In the interim, using international labs or the US 
military’s facilities, or sending in rapid assessment teams from WHO, the US 
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Department of Health and Human Services and DoD to perform remote analysis, 
would be sufficient. The military representatives said that they would use their 
own lab facilities to test their own forces. There was disagreement over whether 
such international capacity should be left behind when the crisis was over, with 
some participants from NGOs and the military feeling that international lab 
facilities should not be left behind, particularly if there was not local technical 
capacity to run them.  
 
When asked why such quick agreement on the need to repair host government 
clinical infrastructure was so difficult to achieve during real-life emergencies, 
participants noted that the different communities had different organization 
cultures, with different responsibilities to their donors. This led to two divides, first 
at the headquarters level, where the problem was viewed differently than on the 
ground. Second, this then translated into different agendas in the field, which 
colored how actors on the ground viewed each other. One US government 
participant said that “there’s not much disagreement on technical issues and 
goals, but when it comes to making those things happen, we have problems.” For 
the military, coordination with NGOs was often viewed with frustration, as it 
slowed down the military’s response time and interfered with efficiency. A UN 
official argued that “coordination very rarely, if ever, happens on the ground. How 
to effect it is to provide accurate and timely information, put it on the table, and 
share it.” 
 
The question of what it means to “control the environment” led to a variety of 
responses. For NGOs and some UN agencies, it meant dealing with the cholera 
outbreak:  setting up a cholera ward at the camps; using resources to prevent the 
spread of the disease; and developing public information campaigns. For other 
UN agencies, it was much broader, meaning to “control the overall political and 
operating environment as well as the epidemic.” The military officers noted that it 
had different meanings “even within and among different branches of the military. 
To me [a medical corps officer], it means controlling cholera. To my boss, it’s 
purely a tactical question, controlling movement of personnel.”  
 
There was significant disagreement over which organizations to coordinate 
efforts with and which organization could lead. Some UN officials and all military 
officials said that the local Ministry of Defense would be an important partner, 
given the security situation. Other UN and US government participants argued 
that the primary partners were the host Ministry of Health and its medical and 
health infrastructure. They maintained that training should be concentrated on 
local MOH and other staff. NGOs argued that, while the MOH had to endorse 
response efforts, it was likely that in circumstances such as this it would be 
incapable of leading the response. One NGO participant argued for ceding the 
lead to a large NGO such as Medecins Sans Frontieres. This provoked debate 
about whether NGOs would accept a role as leader of a team-effort, rather than 
operating unilaterally and according to their own agendas.  The military 
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representatives said they would focus on the host nation as a partner. They 
would request it to issue a quarantine, to empower the local military to enforce it 
and assist in training the local military in how to do so. Military representatives 
expressed doubt that local military commanders would cede control of the 
response to other agencies if there was combat going on.  
 
With regard to advising the JTF commander on providing direct assistance, there 
was significant disagreement between the UN and military representatives. UN 
rules prohibit military forces from providing direct assistance in combat situations, 
while such assistance is allowed in peacetime. One US military participant noted 
that when the US military is engaged in a bilateral, rather than UN mission, it will 
ignore UN mandates. On a bilateral mission, if there is an emergency, direct 
assistance can allowed. Whether the commander will provide it depends on 
whether it violates Title X, whether it diverges from his or her own plans, or if he 
or she lacks sufficient intelligence for authorization from DoD.  The commander 
must consider the primary mission and prior orders, what funds are available 
(and what restrictions are attached to them), and the effect giving aid will have on 
the unit’s ability to respond to other crises as well as on the security situation. 
Convincing the JTF commander to undertake direct assistance would require 
convincing the commander of the need and the unique assets the JTF can bring 
to bear, as well as how it fits in with the commander’s intent. Military participants 
noted that historically, direct assistance is a last resort.   
 
Scenario 1, Part 4: Cholera Controlled  
Part four of the first scenario takes place ten weeks after the cholera epidemic 
officially began. The worst is now over. A cholera task force, chaired by WHO, 
was set up to coordinate and set the priorities for the response. WHO and other 
aid organizations brought in cholera kits and the Aliyan military helped distribute 
re-hydration salts, pit latrine kits, and some vaccines. Aid agencies have also 
begun a nationwide training program for health workers and health assistants. 
There are still cholera cases existing but new incidences have dropped rapidly. 
No deaths have taken place in over a week throughout the reporting system; 
however, there are still requirements for maintenance and surveillance to 
continue. The United Nations peacekeeping forces are withdrawing and will 
attempt to have all personnel out of the country within ninety days.  
Relief agencies and local government officials, who have been relying on military 
transport and other support, are appealing to have the peacekeeping mission 
extended but it does not appear likely that the Security Council will agree. 
Therefore, the UN Security Council has not authorized any direct humanitarian 
assistance to the local population. The separatists have been fairly calm during 
the epidemic but people fear that they are simply waiting for the peacekeepers to 
leave and then will start renewed attacks. Some aid agencies are planning on 
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leaving as soon as the peacekeepers leave to avoid the security risk to their staff; 
most, however, are planning to stay.  
The Ministry of Health has called a meeting of all medical officers and lead 
personnel to review the exit strategy of UN peacekeepers and coordinate filling 
the resulting critical vacancies. The Minister is very well-educated and 
professional; however, government resources are extremely limited and she has 
constantly to fight governmental corruption to pay hospital staff; purchase, 
distribute, and stockpile medicines; and deal with the common health service 
issues of a poor, developing country. The JTF command has not changed its 
position on providing direct assistance.  
Participants were asked to review who should be in charge of coordination of the 
health services in Aliya, and whether there was any need for coordination to take 
place between particular international organizations without Aliyan government 
attendance or knowledge. They were asked to consider what resources their 
organization would leave behind or hand over, and if they had any major 
concerns and/or restrictions with re-allocating these resources. Finally, 
participants were asked, in light of the day’s discussions, what recommended 
changes their parent organization should make for future coordination in a 
disaster and/or conflict setting.  
 
Participants were unanimous that the host Ministry of Health should be in charge 
at this point in the emergency, with some technical assistance from WHO. They 
also generally agreed that interagency meetings would occur without the 
presence of host government representatives, but that these would have to be 
informal, so as not to offend the host government. These meetings would likely 
take place among NGOs and among UN agencies, as well as between the 
foreign military forces and NGOs. There was disagreement as to whether to 
leave behind medical equipment and medicines. NGOs noted that they often left 
these behind. Both would need to be technologically appropriate, and be left with 
properly trained organizations/technicians. The military officers noted that it was 
not their norm to leave equipment behind, but it might be done if the host 
government requested it. NGOs indicated that certain equipment and medicines 
wouldn’t be left if to do so might violate the humanitarian precept to “do no harm.” 
X-ray equipment was an example. Other NGOs noted that it was unlikely that 
equipment and supplies would be left with corrupt government agencies, but 
instead would be turned over to local NGOs. Another concern was that leaving 
certain medicines, particularly narcotics, in the hands of local staff would put 
them at risk of corruption or attack.   
 
Participants all agreed that more coordination needed to happen in advance of 
disasters and above the operational level. Some NGO representatives suggested 
that bringing together high-level NGO personnel and military commanders was 
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necessary to generate real change at the operation level. Some US government 
representatives maintained that operational-level interaction was good, and that 
the main problem lay with the US State Department’s failure to involve NGOs in 
high-level coordination. Some military officials agreed that NGO representatives 
should be invited into operational planning. Other recommendations concerned 
the coordination of after-action reports (AAR)/lessons-learned among all groups 
that worked together during a crisis. Ideally, after-action data will have been 
collected during the crisis for this purpose. Participants stressed that such 
reviews should not only incorporate lessons-learned, but also assess whether 
changes can actually be made. Currently no mechanisms exist to coordinate and 
produce joint AARs. 
 
Scenario 1: Key Findings 
 
The key findings from the day were brought out in the closing plenary session. It 
was clear that NGOs were constrained by their limited resources and staff. 
Establishing a center of gravity for communications and information came to the 
front as a priority. Yet, unlike UN agencies, the strength of NGOs lies in their 
willingness to work in insecure conditions, and to respond to the first reports of an 
outbreak of conflict, catastrophe or disease. The greatest challenge noted by US 
governmental officials was the fact that, unlike US government agencies, NGOs 
are not coordinated via the US ambassador. Furthermore, policy decisions in 
Washington, DC hampered the flow of information and thus reduced operational 
coordination. The second challenge was the embassy’s reliance on host nation 
health officials for information and operational capabilities, as well as on both 
national and international political conditions which might make coordination even 
more difficult. For the military medical corps, the greatest challenge was the 
rapidly changing nature of their mission. Their resources were designed for taking 
care of healthy young soldiers and battle injuries, rather than disaster relief and 
humanitarian medical relief. Their greatest constraint was their original counter-
insurgency mission, which dictated what assistance could be provided; they 
insisted that they would only act in support of the host nation rather than assume 
the lead in providing disaster assistance. UN participants noted that there were 
too many incompatible assessment forms among the various agencies, and that 
assessments should be standardized to facilitate coordination among all players.  
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Part II. Humanitarian Medical and Health Assistance in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Zones 
 
The second day of the simulation exercise had the participants respond to a 
massive earthquake in an area under insurgency and counter-insurgency 
combat, which can be entered only with government permission that is not 
forthcoming. Conflict and post-conflict operations complicate the delivery of 
medical and health assistance in the wake of natural disasters. The role of the 
military in such situations is divided between their primary combat mission and 
humanitarian assistance. Dr. David Tarantino, Jr., a medical doctor in the Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, provides an overview of 
the US Department of Defense’s role in medical and health assistance. His 
presentation describes the policies and activities of the US Defense Department, 
and should not be taken as representative of how other countries use their armed 
forces for humanitarian health and medical assistance.  The second day’s 
scenario, with a summary of the participants’ discussion and key findings, follow 
his chapter.  
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Role of US Department of Defense Health Sector  
in Natural Disaster and Conflict Settings 
 
David Tarantino, Jr., MD,  





In recent years, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) has played an 
increasingly prominent role in health sector mitigation in natural disaster and 
conflict settings.  Public health services were a significant part of the overall DoD 
response to the Asian tsunami (December 2004), Hurricane Katrina (September 
2005), and the Pakistan earthquake (October 2005).  In Afghanistan and Iraq, 
DoD is playing a key role in ongoing health sector stabilization and reconstruction 
work.  DoD has been engaged in these kinds of missions throughout its history, 
but the magnitude of recent events has led to an increased emphasis on civil-
military medicine.  This is clearly illustrated by the newly-signed Department of 
Defense Directive regarding Stability Operations (DODD 3000.05), which directs 
DoD to “ensure DoD medical personnel and capabilities are prepared to meet 
military and civilian health requirements in stability operations.”17
 
 
Civil-Military Medicine  
A discipline within operational medicine comprising public 
health or medical issues that involve a civil-military interface 
(foreign or domestic), including military medical support to 
(domestic) civil authorities, medical security cooperation 
activities, and medical civil-military operations. 
 
Players: 
 DoD: OSD Health Affairs, OSD Stability Operations, Joint Staff, 
Services (SGs), Civil Affairs community, AFMIC, USUHS, 
Combatant Commands, operational units, schools, centers 
 Interagency: State Dept. Office of Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Operations, USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance, Health and Human Services, Homeland 
Security/FEMA 
                                                 
* Director for Civil-Military Medical Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health 
Affairs, US Department of Defense. 
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 International: Allied/Coalition militaries, United Nations 
(WHO, UNOCHA), ICRC, host nation officials (Ministry of 
Health), various NGOs 
 
 
The mission of the DoD military health system has traditionally been focused 
internally on delivering medical care to our active duty, retired, and dependent 
beneficiaries, and providing force health protection and medical support to our 
personnel deployed in harm’s way. The increasing emphasis on civil-military 
medicine and medical aspects of stability operations establishes an additional 
core mission that is externally focused.   
 
With regard to DoD’s health sector role in natural disasters and conflict settings, 
force health protection and deployed medical support still constitute the primary 
responsibility of the military health system.  Natural disasters and conflict settings 
pose myriad unique challenges for force health protection which must be 
addressed early in the planning process.  This paper will focus on the other – 
external – civil-military medicine roles that DoD might be expected to play in 
natural disaster and conflict settings. 
 
DOD CIVIL-MILITARY MEDICINE ROLES 
Before exploring the various health sector roles DoD might engage in, it is 
instructive to highlight the importance of engaging in the health sector at all.  The 
quality of health has been repeatedly linked to the (in)stability and (in)security of 
nations or regions.  Inadequate health care can be a cause or consequence of 
instability or conflict, so any effort to prevent or address instability or conflict must 
consider the health sector.18  While DoD does not and should not have lead 
responsibility for health sector issues, when appropriate, it can contribute 
resources and expertise in support of a coordinated US government (USG) effort 
to bolster host nation and international health sector efforts. 
 
With the goal of enhancing preparedness for natural disasters and preventing 
instability or conflict, DoD conducts a broad array of medical security cooperation 
activities.  These include disaster preparedness projects focused on first 
responder training and post-traumatic stress prevention and treatment; 
humanitarian assistance such as health clinic construction or donation of excess 
medical property; disease surveillance and mitigation efforts; and HIV/AIDS 








Civil-Military Medicine  
Domestic: 
9 Homeland Defense/Military Support to Civil 




9 Humanitarian Assistance (HA) projects (first responder 
training) 
9 Humanitarian and Civic Assistance projects  
9 Disease surveillance projects (Caribbean 
Epidemiology Center)  
9 HIV/AIDS prevention efforts in militaries/peacekeepers 
9 Disaster preparedness projects (warehouses/medical 
stockpiles) 
9 Disaster Assessment and Response activities 
(Hurricane Mitch) 
9 Medical stability operations (Afghanistan) 




These activities are designed to prepare host nations to respond to the medical 
and public health aspects of natural disasters, and to promote stability and 
prevent conflict by supporting and improving health care. They are also designed 
to better prepare DoD to respond in the event of a disaster or conflict through 




Another civil-military medicine role for DoD is disaster relief; particularly the 
public health aspects of disaster relief.  In the past year alone, DoD has made 
significant contributions to the public health components of relief assistance 
following the Asian tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, and the Pakistan earthquake.  
With its extensive global medical assets, DoD is often uniquely positioned to play 
a critical role in immediate life-saving relief efforts as well as follow-on public 
health care.  This is not to suggest, however, that DoD has, or should have, lead 
responsibility for disaster relief.  
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DoD International Disaster Relief 
 USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), not 
DoD, has lead for USG response to foreign disasters. 
 
 OFDA may request DoD assistance in certain cases: 
9 Scope of disaster overwhelms Host Nation and 
USG 
9 In the US national interest 
9 Host Nation desires and will accept DoD 
assistance 
9 Verified requirements for DoD unique 
assets/capabilities 
9 DoD mission clearly defined/exit conditions clear 
 
 
Lead responsibility lies with the host nation and international and non-
governmental organizations, such as the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, the World Health Organization, and 
UNICEF.  If USG assistance is requested, lead responsibility lies with the State 
Department and its embassy, and the US Agency for International Development’s 
(USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).   
 
 
DoD Response to the Asian Tsunami  
 
Combined Support Force (CSF) - 536 Surgeon’s 
Mission: 
 
“To minimize the effects of wounds, injuries, diseases 
as well as environmental and occupational hazards 
brought on by the tsunami-effected areas of Sri Lanka, 
Indonesia and Thailand. 
 
To facilitate in collaboration with the host nation and 
other nation(s), USAID/OFDA, the ability of the UN and 
NGO’s to conduct relief efforts after CSF-536 is 
deactivated.” 
9 Force protection must be addressed 
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DoD assistance is generally sought if the resources or capabilities of these 
organizations are overwhelmed.  Since disaster relief is usually relatively non-
controversial, and usually takes place in permissive, non-conflict environments, 
DoD involvement is generally well accepted, provided that the mission is clearly 
defined and appropriately circumscribed.  Host nations and non-governmental 
organizations may resist DoD assistance that is perceived to duplicate or 
overshadow their capabilities or efforts. 
 
The final, most complex and most controversial civil-military medical role for DoD 
is health sector support in conflict settings, such as in stability or reconstruction 
operations.  Such health sector support can range from the provision of basic 
care to civilians in the midst of combat operations, to stabilization and 
establishment of host nation basic health services until other organizations or a 
new government can take the lead, to wholesale reestablishment and 




Medical Security Cooperation  
 
 
DoD Health Sector Support in 
Afghanistan
Combatant Command-directed, 
health-related activities, aligned 
with Theater Security 
Cooperation Strategies and in 
cooperation with foreign 
partners, that promote security 
and stability and deter 
aggression by supporting the 
health sector, thereby: 
  
9 building relationships that 
promote specified US interests;  
9 building allied and friendly 
capabilities for self-defense 
and coalition operations; and  
9 providing US forces with 
peacetime and contingency 
access. 
 
 Commander’s Emergency Response 
Program 
9 144 health/medical projects funded 
 Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, 
and Civic Aid (OHDACA) 
9 45 health/medical projects 
approved 
9 Including OSD/Sec. Health and 
Human Services priority Rabia 
Balkhi project 
9 Estimated cost: $8.1M 
9 1/3 of all OHDACA expenditures = 
health/medical 
 Capacity-building support to Afghan 
Ministry of Public Health 
 Support to Afghan National Army – 
Medical 







Building Afghan Medical Capacity (Photo: OASD, DoD) 
 
 
Again, DoD generally would not be expected to take the lead in these areas, but 
in a conflict setting, where other organizations may not be able to fulfill their 
traditional roles, and when vital USG interests are at stake, DoD may be asked to 
play a major part in health sector stabilization and reconstruction efforts – as is 
the case in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
DOD ORGANIZATION AND APPROACH 
 
One of DoD’s strengths is a clearly defined organizational and command and 
control structure. This generally applies to the organization of and approach to 
health sector operations in disaster and conflict settings. Policy making and 
strategic guidance regarding DoD health sector efforts are coordinated at the 
Washington level, among the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Health Affairs, the Stability Operations office and the Joint Staff Surgeon.  This 
includes outreach and coordination with other USG agencies (Department of 
State, USAID/OFDA, Department of Health and Human Services), and with 
appropriate international (e.g., WHO, UNICEF, UNOCHA) and non-governmental 
organizations. 
 
The functional center of gravity for DoD is the Regional Combatant Command 
(e.g., Central Command, Pacific Command, Southern Command, European 
Command).  The Regional Combatant Commander is responsible for organizing, 
planning, and conducting contingency operations within his area of 
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Figure 1. The Place of DoD in US Interagency Disaster Relief Coordination 
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responsibility. Each Combatant Commander has a Command Surgeon who 
advises on and coordinates the health and medical aspects of any operations.   
 
Contingency operations are generally conducted under the tactical command and 
control of a Joint Task Force (Commander) established by and reporting to the 
Regional Combatant Commander.  Joint Task Forces (JTF) are flexible 
constructs that vary in size and make-up based on the mission.  For example, 
Coalition Joint Task Force – 76 (CJTF-76) in Afghanistan is a long-standing 
combat-oriented task force established to coordinate and conduct combat and 
counterterrorist activities.  CJTF-76 also conducts civil-military and 
health/medical activities that are complementary to its core mission.  Combined 
Support Force – 536, a unique variant of the JTF, was established to coordinate 
and conduct initial Asian tsunami relief efforts.  At its peak, it included over 
15,000 DoD personnel, but it was deactivated after less than two months, as host 
nations and other civilian and international organizations became capable of 
dealing with the situation. 
 
Like the Combatant Commands, every Joint Task Force has a JTF Surgeon (and 
staff) to handle health and medical activities.  On the health side, at the tactical or 
implementing level, are division, brigade and unit surgeons and medics and 
deployed health facilities.  JTFs typically also have a civil-military operations 
(CMO) section with a broad range of responsibilities in that sector; the tactical 
 
(OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER 
ASSISTANCE) 
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implementers are Civil Affairs forces.  Because health sector issues and activities 
can intersect with Surgeon and CMO responsibilities, careful coordination 
between these groups is critical. As with the JTF itself, the surgeon and CMO 
sections are flexible constructs that are adaptable to the specific mission.  
Continuing with the above examples, in Afghanistan, the CJTF-76 surgeon and 
medical force focus largely – though not exclusively – on force health protection, 
while after the 2004 tsunami, the CSF-536 surgeon and medical force played a 
leading role in the initial public health response. 
 
 
The functional or operational center of gravity for DoD is the 
Regional Combatant Command. Each Combatant 
Commander has a Command Surgeon who advises on and 
coordinates the health and medical aspects of any 
operations.   
 
 
In the face of a natural disaster or conflict with significant public health 
consequences, DoD’s general approach is to provide assistance as requested, in 
support of the lead USG agencies and the larger USG effort, which in turn 
supports other international and host nation activities. Within DoD, every attempt 
is made to establish lines of communication and coordination with relevant 
stakeholders from the policy and strategic (Washington) level to the operational 
(Combatant Command) level to the tactical (Joint Task Force) level.  DoD also 
works hard to coordinate its missions with relevant stakeholders across the USG 
(State, USAID, HHS), as well as with international and non-governmental actors, 
and most importantly with host nation officials.  At the Joint Task Force level, 
DoD will often establish a Civil-Military Operations Center (see Figure 2), as a 
neutral venue for the exchange of civil-military information including health sector 













DOD STRENGTHS IN HEALTH SECTOR EFFORTS 
 
DoD brings significant strengths to health sector support in natural disaster or 
conflict settings.  Foremost is a global and expeditionary force structure. DoD has 
resources and assets around the globe that are designed for expeditionary 
deployment and can be drawn upon, when appropriate, in times of crisis.  DoD 
also excels at establishing command, control, communication and coordination 
mechanisms and structures in the chaotic environments typical of natural 
disasters and conflicts.  DoD has tremendous transportation capabilities – air, 
sea, ground – which can be brought to bear in a crisis, as well as significant 
supply and logistics capabilities.  Specifically regarding health, DoD has a large 
pool of mobile, highly skilled public health and civil affairs experts, and can 
rapidly deploy an array of scalable medical care facilities, transport critical 
medical supplies, conduct detailed health sector assessments, and provide state-
of-the-art disease surveillance capabilities. Figure 3 illustrates some of these 
strengths, in the case of DoD’s response to the Asian tsunami.  Finally, DoD is 
organized, trained and equipped to operate in the harshest and most dangerous 
environments, including direct combat operations.  Many of these strengths were 
displayed during the immediate aftermath of the liberation of Iraq, when DoD 
medical personnel and Civil Affairs experts worked with USG, international, and 





Figure 3. US Department of Defense Assistance in the Asian Tsunami 
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42 additional aircraft, and 25 ships in the Combined Support 
Groups (CSG) and Combined Support Force (CSF). 
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DOD WEAKNESSES IN HEALTH SECTOR EFFORTS 
 
Along with DoD’s many strengths in the health sector arena are several 
significant weaknesses.  Foremost is the fact that humanitarian assistance and 
health sector support has not typically been DoD’s “day job.”  Other host nation, 
international and USG organizations typically predate DoD health sector 
involvement in a given situation, and will remain active long after DoD’s role 
ends.  These organizations tend to have greater local knowledge and expertise, 
and have more specific training and experience in health sector assistance during 
natural disasters or conflicts.  Furthermore, DoD’s experience and approach 
tends to  
 
Medical Outreach Porgram (Photo: OASD, DoD) 
 
 
be contingency-based and time-limited – that is, short-term relief or crisis 
response – while these other organizations usually take a longer-term 
development and reconstruction approach.  For example, DoD was well-suited to 
provide significant early relief assistance in the aftermath of the Asian tsunami, 
while ongoing, long-term health sector stabilization and reconstruction efforts in 




DoD is also limited by insufficient education and training opportunities for its 
health care professionals in the health aspects of natural disasters and conflict 
settings.   A final challenge is the seemingly unavoidable resentment and 
resistance to DoD involvement in “humanitarian” activities such as health sector 
assistance by certain non-governmental organizations.  This resistance tends to 
be most prominent in politically or emotionally charged “conflict” settings.  This 
was indeed the case in Iraq, where DoD (representing the USG) found itself 
simultaneously criticized for not meeting its obligations as an occupying power 
(for example, to ensure basic needs of the civilian populace), and for involving 




DoD clearly has a significant health sector role in natural disaster and conflict 
settings.  This has been demonstrated by recent DoD contributions to the health 
sector component of relief efforts for the Asian tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, and 
the Pakistan earthquake, as well as through ongoing health sector stabilization 
and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The scope and extent of 
DoD’s health sector role will vary depending on such factors as the scope of the 
disaster or conflict; USG national security interests; and the capability of other 
USG agencies, international organizations, and host nations to address health 
needs.  In general, DoD’s health sector role should be in support of a larger USG 
effort, which is in turn supportive of larger international and host nation activities.  
DoD’s strengths are global presence, command and control, logistics, 
transportation and the ability to operate in any environment.  These strengths are 
generally optimally utilized during the early relief phase of a disaster or conflict, 
while other organizations are mobilizing their longer-term response.  
Circumstances, however, may also dictate DoD involvement in more complex, 





Scenario 2: A Devastating Earthquake as Winter Approaches 
The scenario for the second day of the game is again set against the overall 
background of a UN peacekeeping mission – the UN Aliyan Force (UNAF) – and a 
US-Aliyan bilateral Joint Task Force (JTF) to counter the remaining insurgents 
and terrorism. This second scenario takes place without regard to the previous 
day’s work. In this new scenario, the main urban centers of Aliya are relatively 
peaceful. UNAF is training the local police force to contain and prevent crime. 
Anti-terrorism measures are concentrated in the mountainous part of the island 
targeting the separatist leader who has been identified as the mastermind behind 
the recent worldwide bombing campaign that has killed hundreds of innocent 
people. Humanitarian workers have not been given permission by the Aliyan 
government to provide aid in this district due to the secretive nature of the JTF 
activities. Within the country in general, infrastructure is being rehabilitated; local 
airports are open and operating, while markets in all districts have shown 
increased produce and livestock. Although the government has established a 
professional civil service office in each district, funding shortages and 
communication breakdowns render most offices incapable of providing the 
necessary basic services they are set up to perform.  
The National Health System is inadequate. While many of the indigenous doctors 
have trained in Europe or the United States, they practice mainly around the 
capital. All other health services are performed at clinics run by community health 
workers trained in basic medical practices.  Participants were divided into three 
groups to work through the four parts of the scenario. 
Scenario 2, Part 1: The Immediate Aftermath 
The first part of the day’s scenario takes place in early fall, two days after an 
earthquake of 7.6 on the Richter scale struck the northeast part of Aliya. A series 
of aftershocks (magnitude between 5.4 and 5.9) followed and a number of 
villages were destroyed. The capital and other cities were affected and many 
people are feared to be trapped under the rubble. In the northeast, the death toll 
is expected to be in the thousands. The Aliyan military, UNAF, and the JTF have 
been trying to perform assessments as well as search and rescue missions, but 
have been hindered by armed separatist resistance. Although Aliya lies in the 
Indian Ocean, the high mountainous areas are subject to extreme cold and sleet 
during the winter months.  
 
The humanitarian community is extremely concerned about the approaching 
winter and how the population will survive. Their detailed knowledge of the 
highlanders is limited due to previous travel restrictions. They do know that the 
population centers are remote, widespread, and poor. In the urban areas, where 
buildings were made of concrete, material from the rubble is mostly unusable. 
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Many homes in the rural areas were built in river basins or on unstable 
mountainsides. While the destruction was more severe than in the cities, the 
stones, wood and corrugated iron of these fallen buildings can be retrieved and 
reused.  
Participants played the role of the senior medical officer for their organization and 
have been in the country for six months. Prior to the earthquake, military medical 
officers have been spending most of their time dealing with force protection 
issues between JTF and Aliyan troops. Government medical officers have been 
trying to work with the State Department on medical advisories for US tourism. 
HA personnel have been working to support the health clinics. With the 
emergency at hand, participants were tasked with assessing the damage to the 
Aliyan health system and establish the relief requirements, if any, for assisting the 
people affected by the earthquake. Participants were asked to establish their 
priorities for making assessments and who would participate in them. Participants 
considered how they would reach all parts of the country in a timely manner to 
gather information, how they would target their health activities, and which 
indirect health issues might affect the health system in ways relevant to their 
organizations. 
All participants agreed that they would first undertake an assessment of their own 
personnel and damage to their own infrastructure. NGOs, UN and US embassy 
officials immediately focused on the question of gaining access to the disaster 
zones, particularly in the conflict areas, in order to assess the damage. The UN 
and embassy officials suggested means to bring about a humanitarian ceasefire. 
US officials emphasized that their efforts would be conditioned by their public 
support for the host government’s counter-insurgency effort. They and military 
players said they would immediately seek higher-level guidance to expand the 
scope of the mission and guidelines for access and support to other 
organizations. They, the JTF and the UN agencies would need permission from 
the host government, however, to begin to act. The embassy and UN players 
stressed that the host nation’s formal disaster declaration is the first step to begin 
the entire process of meetings, assessments and response.  NGOs are not 
constrained in this manner – they would begin information gathering, appeals for 
donations and planning even without a disaster declaration. 
 
Information was again the first priority. Most participants agreed that at this stage 
in the catastrophe, only the JTF would have the capacity to provide information 
on the impact of the earthquakes, especially in the conflict zones. They also 
mainly agreed that the MOH would be the preferred primary conduit for 
information, and that NGOs in particular would avoid direct contact with the JTF.  
Some NGO players said they would focus on rapid response, and would first 
seek whatever information they could locally, then go out to collect it themselves. 
They would share this information with OFDA, but not directly with the US 
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military. They would seek to share as little information as possible so as not to 
jeopardize the security and safety of their staff. This surprised many of the 
military players.  
NGOs and the UN agencies agreed that they would know that the JTF had 
previous assessments and satellite reconnaissance of the conflict zones, and 
would seek to gain this information. The UN agencies would rely on the JTF 
rather than UNAF forces for logistical support if JTF allowed it, but would prefer 
that assessment teams include other organizations than the military alone. NGOs 
would be more comfortable with the information being channeled through the 
MOH, the UN or OFDA. Embassy officials would seek an assessment from the 
JTF, and would pass the information to the MOH. Military and embassy players 
stressed that satellite imagery would be classified and would not be shared, but 
that there would be a willingness to share unclassified data, and to declassify 
wherever possible. Most players were surprised to learn that OFDA in 
Washington, DC played a central role in approving the release of information to 
NGOs and other agencies during the 2005 tsunami response. 
Some NGOs pointed out they would not trust damage assessments from the 
military, but would seek military information on security in order to conduct their 
own assessments. Other NGOs said their first concern would be to see to the 
basic needs (e.g., food, shelter and water supply) of the affected populations, and 
therefore they would need information on the demographics of the affected areas. 
They would tap MOH officials from these regions to do an initial assessment. All 
players agreed that they would also plan to work from host government reports, 
and extrapolate the impact of the earthquakes from these various sources of 
information. The military players suggested that after the initial assessment of 
their own forces, they would likely use Special Forces to evaluate the situation in 
the affected area for themselves, to determine whether there was the need for a 
combat response in the area, how it could be secured, and how the local 
community could be assisted. They would recommend establishing a Civil-
Military Operations Center (CMOC) immediately. 
 
UN agencies would convene a UN DAC team to get a picture of the most 
pressing needs and to determine the status of the community health centers 
outside of the capital. They would also run a joint briefing of the NGOs to assess 
which were equipped to meet different needs.  
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This led to a productive discussion of how NGOs and UN agencies could learn to 
ask the military the right questions in terms of what information they needed. For 
example, NGOs don’t necessarily need satellite images of a disaster zone (which 
may be classified), but rather specific information that the images will provide, 
such as the movement of refugee populations or damage to infrastructure. It was 
suggested that a standardized assessment form could be given by USAID to the 
JTF to get the initial information on structures and shelter. As a common 
standardized assessment form does not currently exist, one should be developed 
that can be used in training and education before a disaster response is needed. 
All generally agreed that their primary need at this stage was to learn the status 
of critical infrastructure (e.g., water, sanitation, shelter, medical clinics, and public 
health facilities), the number of people living in the disaster zones, population 
movements of those affected, as well as types of terrain and transportation 
requirements to bring in aid. 
There was much debate about whether NGOs would gain access to the conflict 
zone and whether the US JTF forces would allow this to happen. NGOs insisted 
that most of them would seek access regardless of the conflict. Some of the NGO 
players said they would negotiate armed escorts from rebel forces in the conflict 
zones if need be. If expatriates were denied access then local staff teams would 
go into these areas, and it was thought likely insurgents would allow them in. One 
NGO participant told the group that in the past he has secured “safe passage” 
from insurgent forces, thus gaining access for his team to address the health 
needs of civilian populations living in conflict zones.  While acknowledging that 
this is controversial, the participant suggested that he would do the same in the 
face of a potential cholera outbreak in Aliya. 
 
Other NGOs would seek JTF assistance for transportation to the disaster zones 
to conduct assessments. Embassy officials said that they would request an 
OFDA Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), and that they would be 
willing to facilitate security escorts from the JTF for NGOs that were comfortable 
with such escorts, provide information to those that were not comfortable with 
armed escorts, and arrange checkpoints into and out of the conflict zones as a 
 
UNDAC Team (Photo: UN OCHA) 
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means of tracking where NGOs and other aid agencies were operating. A major 
concern for the embassy and military players was the prospect of having to 
rescue trapped NGO workers from the conflict zone or have them caught in the 
cross-fire. Military players stressed that they would seek to control and restrict 
NGO access.  There was some disagreement among the military players as to 
whether they would welcome humanitarian assistance to the insurgents. Some 
suggested that equal distribution to all parties would be seen as critical to the 
JTF’s “hearts and minds” campaign. Others were much less sanguine about 
providing access to insurgents. 
 
Scenario 2, Part 2: One Week in, with Isolated Reports of Flu 
The second part of the scenario occurs one week after the earthquake hit. The 
Aliyan government estimates that nearly 40,000 people have been killed and 
60,000 injured. Approximately 1 million people have been left without shelter and 
the severe winter weather is due to begin in less than a month. The international 
community and individuals have been very quick to respond and have been very 
generous; however, the difficult terrains, remote locations, destruction of 
infrastructure and weather conditions are obstructing the relief effort. The Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General, the lead for UNAF and UN operations 
in Aliya, has visited several sites in Aliya and has stressed the need for 
emergency shelter and rescue operations. She has also called for a coordination 
committee to be set up by the UN to coordinate the relief efforts. The Aliyan 
government has been giving customs exemptions, arranging visas, and providing 
emergency flight clearances to aid the effort, although some members of the 
government have voiced concerns that some nations and agencies are using the 
disaster to facilitate illegal entry into the country. The JTF, along with the Aliyan 
military, remain more cautious about coordinating outside the secure urban 
centers and appear to be dragging their feet in supporting humanitarian activities.  
 
Initial health assessments indicate many people continue to struggle without 
clean water, shelter, food or basic medicines. Many families are being forced to 
share water and shelter with their livestock. Hundreds of people stream into the 
main health centers for urgent medical attention to crushed limbs and horribly 
infected wounds. Diarrhea and acute respiratory infections are increasing and 
there is fear that a flu epidemic will hit the area. An assessment team has just 
returned from the highlands with pharyngeal swab specimens collected from ill 
persons, from which the Aliyan Institute for Disease Control isolated four 
influenza A viruses (two of which were sub-typed as A(H3N2) viruses). They 
estimate that 95% of the deaths from influenza have not been investigated due to 
several factors – remote location, recent earthquake, malnutrition, lack of testing 
facilities. The team recommends the following: expand influenza surveillance; 
educate the public and health care providers about influenza; improve access to 
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health care in rural areas; and, ensure that adequate supplies of antibiotics are 
available at health centers to treat the bacterial complications of influenza.  
The weather has turned cold in the highlands (below freezing every night; highs 
during the day just below 40˚ F.) and satellite weather forecasts predict this trend 
will continue. Participants were asked whether they would attend a WHO 
coordinating meeting or prefer to coordinate with other agencies; which reports 
have credibility; whether the assessment team’s report affects their 
organizations; whether they would follow the team’s recommendations; and what 
their organization’s priorities would be at this stage of the emergency. 
The debate indicated that there were significant divergences among the 
communities about whose reports would be considered reliable and about 
information sharing. UN agencies and NGOs indicated that information coming 
from the JTF would not necessarily be considered neutral, and much of their trust 
would depend on the person communicating with them from the military side. 
Again, there was agreement among NGOs and UN agencies that the military 
should be represented by embassy officials at coordinating meetings. Some 
NGOs would refuse to participate if military personnel were present. Some NGOs 
suggested that “only WHO or ICRC would have full reporting credibility.” 
Embassy players suggested such mistrust was misplaced, as spreading incorrect 
assessments would run counter to their interests in stabilizing the situation and 
opening up access to the affected populations. Embassy and military players 
suggested that there would be good coordination and trust among themselves on 
the ground, though this would not necessarily be true at higher levels.  
 
Most participants from all communities agreed that the reports of influenza would 
not be a priority for their organizations, given the magnitude of the medical and 
public health needs arising from the earthquake. Limited resources would not be 
diverted to treating flu. As one NGO participant stated, “without solid evidence on 
casualties, there is no practical epidemic.” Some NGO players suggested they 
would be concerned with getting a credible assessment of the threat posed by flu. 
Most participants suggested that their organizations’ priorities would remain 
focused on the broader humanitarian disaster, while military players noted that 
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations remained their primary 
mission, and they would be in a support role at best in the humanitarian effort. UN 
and NGO players said their priority would be to set up camps outside of the 
conflict zone in order to provide treatment if access to the affected area could not 
be arranged. To assess the flu threat, they would interview IDPs. They also 
recognized that part of the response would be driven by the media. Many 
(perhaps most) aid organizations would flock to where the media were reporting 
from, whether that was in the conflict zone or not; others would seek to draw 
media attention to locations where they were able to operate. The media would 
be critical to raising funds for the response effort. Players also recognized that 
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the parties to the conflict would also use the media to reflect a humanitarian 
image for themselves, and would consider concentrating resources where the 
media were.  
Scenario 2, Part 3: Influenza Epidemic and Increasing Violence 
In the third part of the scenario, the flu epidemic in Aliya has reached a critical 
stage. Over 4,500 deaths have been attributed to the flu despite the humanitarian 
efforts to control the outbreak. Countless (suspected) infected people roam the 
rural areas. The violence in the highlands has increased steadily, as the 
population firmly believes that the flu was brought by the JTF and Aliyan military 
soldiers during their ‘assessment’ missions. International humanitarian workers 
have been targeted as being on the side of the government and cannot operate 
without armed security. Trapped in the middle of the violence and disease are 
tens of thousands of rural peasants who have ever decreasing access to any kind 
of medical help.  
The separatists are attempting to use the humanitarian disaster to their political 
advantage. They offer a cease-fire if they are given the drugs to combat the flu, 
so that they can distribute them. One NGO agrees to these terms, but discovers 
some of the relief supplies for sale in the local market only two days after delivery 
to the separatists. The separatists appear to be fully willing to let their people die 
without the drugs and medical supplies. They have agreed to let humanitarian 
workers provide limited assistance, but only if accompanied by one of their 
representatives. The Aliyan government insists that the separatists be treated by 
all as a rebel force and do not let JTF negotiators agree to any compromise. The 
JTF commander has restricted his forces from any direct involvement in 
implementing health services to the local population beyond the “hearts and 
minds” campaign already running. All groups are adhering to the Aliyan 
government’s policy of not dealing with the rebels but military, embassy and NGO 
medical officers are concerned about the potential loss of life that can result from 
this political stand, as this problem has expanded beyond their direct sphere of 
influence.  
More deaths from influenza, along with an ice storm predicted to arrive in two 
days, are reported on the local news. The international media are focusing on the 
fact that people are dying, and accuse the JTF and humanitarian communities of 
not addressing the suffering. Participants were asked to determine what the most 
urgent issues for their organizations would be in this situation and what their 
recommendations would be regarding relations with the media, the local 
populations’ perceptions, and donors.  
 
Participants diverged in their organizational priorities. For most NGOs, the urgent 
issue was to provide general medical care as well as food, water and shelter to 
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the affected populations, regardless of the conflict. As in the first part of this 
scenario, they would seek access to the rebel-held areas despite the 
government’s position. They would negotiate with the separatists and the 
government for “humanitarian space” in which to provide aid. As a fall-back, they 
would set up camps as close as possible to the rebel-held areas. The NGO 
players noted that some NGOs would accept “guarded space” with armed 
guards, but others would not. However, some NGO players said that they would 
withdraw their staff to the capital until negotiations produced a more peaceful 
situation, and that they would seek to prevent the diversion of medical supplies to 
the black market. Other NGOs dismissed this as part of doing business, and that 
they remained convinced that the rebels could be negotiated with, and that NGOs 
would work in the conflict zone until their own personnel came under threat of 
attack.  
For the UN, embassy and military players, the most urgent issue was the lack of 
agreement between the government and the separatists. These players indicated 
that they would pressure the host government to compromise, as the health 
situation would only get worse. The embassy officials indicated that they would 
try to find ways to channel medicines and funds to NGOs, as these organizations 
would continue to go into the conflict zones. The military and UN players 
generally agreed that this would be their strategy as well. The military players 
noted that the “hearts and minds” campaign already underway allowed the JTF 
commander considerable leeway in providing direct humanitarian assistance, as 
well as facilitating access for NGOs to the region. However, the military also 
pointed out that their primary mission would dictate how they would behave. 
Undermining the host government or its military was unacceptable, as was 
contributing in any way to terrorist activities. They noted that the size of this 
particular JTF would not enable it to affect health issues to much extent in the 
nation, so for the JTF the primary health issue would be force health protection, 
and then working to contain the spread of the disease.  
This led the conversation to the effect of winter on operations, and the pros and 
cons of air-drops. Winter conditions would limit the capabilities of the military in 
terms of low altitude air-support, and all players’ access to the mountainous 
regions. The possibility that the mountain population would move to lower 
altitudes was raised. NGOs cautioned against airdrops, especially for medical 
needs, as medical and health assistance could not be delivered without the 
presence of trained personnel. Military players suggested that they could team up 
with NGOs to coordinate where supplies would be left.  
 
The players agreed that all of them, as well as the host government and the 
separatists, would try to use the media to their advantage. They noted that radio 
distribution was a key means of communicating with far-flung populations, and 
that they would broadcast health education and prevention information as well as 
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work to dispel rumors. One participant suggested a media strategy that would 
prompt journalists to ask awkward questions of the government regarding 
access, as a means of indirect pressure.  
Players also all anticipated negative coverage. All the organizations stated they 
would train and instruct their staff on how to handle the media. UN agencies 
would need to maintain an image of neutrality and independence, while some 
NGOs would focus on their mandate of “bearing witness” and speaking out about 
the suffering of the population and the government’s intransigence. All NGOs 
would use the media as a means of raising funds, as would UN agencies. The 
embassy and military officials would ask for assistance from WHO and other UN 
agencies to participate in a media campaign to refute the popular perception that 
JTF forces were responsible for spreading the flu. They would seek to work with 
ministry officials from the insurgent region to organize supply drops on their 
behalf.  
Scenario 2, Part 4: Transition to Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
The final part of the scenario takes place in late spring as the situation shifts from 
emergency humanitarian response toward reconstruction and development. The 
influenza epidemic has run its course and Aliya is recovering from the earthquake 
as best it can. Reconstruction has provided work for many people and the re-
building of their own country has brought them together. The separatists do not 
have the support that they once had and many Aliyans feel their behavior during 
the earthquake crisis is inexcusable. In an effort to appease the international 
donors who gave to the earthquake disaster, the Aliyan government has offered a 
general amnesty to separatists who immediately cease all violence. UNAF has 
completed its training of the police force, which is now being deployed throughout 
the population centers of the country. UNAF’s mission was not renewed and its 
personnel are preparing to leave the country. The last mission of the JTF is 
focused on the remote rural areas where some hard-line separatists remain in 
hiding. It will be handing over its mission to the Aliyan military in six weeks. 
The humanitarian situation remains precarious as poverty, corruption, and human 
rights abuses continue, albeit on a smaller scale than before. The humanitarian 
community has almost completely rolled over its international staff from 
emergency/disaster personnel to rehabilitation/development personnel. Donors 
are requesting longer term project proposals for the health situation in the country 
and are not accepting any more disaster-related proposals.  
 
Participants were asked to focus on how their priorities would change in this 
phase of the operation, and what effects this would have on the need for 
coordination and preferred partner organizations. They were tasked to 
recommend changes to their parent organizations for future coordination, and to 
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describe how they would prioritize the operations of other organizations’ health 
programs.  
 
All participants agreed that the critical partner at this stage would be the Ministry 
of Health. As one NGO participant said, “now that we are getting into a state of 
peace, the minister of health takes over, our reign has ended.” NGOs noted that 
funding would increasingly determine their presence in the country. Many NGOs 
would be wrapping up their operations and leaving the country. Health issues 
would only be “an add-on activity to some larger recovery project.” General health 
care would be low on NGO agendas because it is not a highly visible project. 
They stressed that this environment would be extremely competitive in terms of 
searching for donors to sustain a multi-year health-related program. They noted 
that as the NGOs leave, the local economy will be negatively affected, as 
unemployment will rise. This will increase security concerns for NGO staff 
traveling in the country. As humanitarian response NGOs leave, development 
NGOs will arrive to fill in some of the gaps. 
 
All other players emphasized that this would be a transition phase from 
emergency response to long-term health care needs. UN players said that there 
would be an opening for a greater UN lead in this situation. The UN disaster 
agencies would give way to UN development agencies, such as UNDP. They 
would be working to support the health ministry, particularly in the areas formerly 
under the control of rebel forces.  Projects would include designing health 
centers, and building up local capacity and resources. Similarly, embassy players 
said they would transition from emergency response to routine medical and 
health assistance. They would continue to coordinate with the JTF to equip the 
host government to take over and sustain national activities. Their focus would be 
on strengthening local government capacity — in particular ensuring that the MOH 
was back to were it had been before the emergency — as well as  strategizing on 
what projects should be developed and funded.  
 
The JTF would also determine which aspects of its mission were complete and 
which required ongoing efforts. Personnel would develop criteria and processes 
for completing the transition:  whom to hand programs over to; training and 
sustainability projects; what supplies and equipment could be left behind; and 
timing. They would also be concerned with a media campaign to prevent the 
impression that they were leaving too quickly. The embassy players noted that 
the US government’s default position was that nothing should be left behind; only 
in exceptional case would supplies and equipment be left. Most NGO players 
agreed, noting that they needed to consider the appropriateness of supplies that 
had been brought in. Only items that augmented the indigenous system should 
be left, as it was important not to create a new unsustainable health system. They 
also noted that whoever received these supplies would in effect have been given 




One of the key learning points came when participants realized that by this time, 
the JTF would have long since developed capacities (such as trained local 
employees) that would have been useful to the NGO community. It was also 
clear, however, that participants remained completely unaware of what each 
community had or needed. They agreed that actors should attempt to develop 
greater information sharing on such capacities and critical shortfalls in the 
transition phase. 
 
The need for broad, intra-community coordination would have significantly 
diminished at this point.  As one UN player noted, “the nature of coordination 
changes completely” at this stage of the operation, as operations take on a more 
routine character. The main coordinating partner for all communities would be the 
Ministry of Health. Other coordination would occur, but primarily within the NGO 
community, among the UN agencies, and between the embassy and JTF. The 
embassy would also coordinate with those NGOs to which it was making grants. 
 
When asked to make recommendations, the players generally agreed that there 
was a long-standing problem with planning and coordinating the end-of-mission 
transitions. UN players recognized that UN agencies were not very good at 
ending programs, as local organizations and ministries were often hesitant to 
take over technical programs. Other UN players noted that preparing to end an 
operation required advance agreement among UN agencies and other 
organizations on the definition of the criteria for ending a mission or “end state,” 
who would assume certain mission aspects, and phasing of withdrawal. The key 
for success in this regard would be to build relationships with other organizations 
and agencies early, and to start working toward the end-of-mission transition 
earlier.  
 
NGOs agreed that they tended not to focus on outcomes and measures of 
positive impact and effectiveness, but rather on minimum standards, and that this 
was an area for improvement. The definition of when goals had been met was 
effectively set by donors, which in turn determined when programs ended. Very 
few NGOs had the financial resources to develop their own metrics and exit 
criteria; only self-funded or large agencies such as Medecins Sans Frontieres or 
Oxfam were capable of doing so.  As occurred the previous day, the participants 
agreed that bringing all the parties to the operation together for after-action 
reviews and analyses would be useful. US government players suggested that 
AARs be incorporated into the final stages of all humanitarian operations. Again, 
the problem that there was no one agency responsible for coordinating an AAR 
was raised. Too many separate and overlapping AARs are developed, without 
being shared among the entire community. Others noted that such reviews could 
produce information overload, and even the US military’s AAR system was 




The participants agreed that a significant challenge was the lack of a system for 
institutionalizing the lessons and information gained in each disaster that could 
then be accessed by all communities. Ideally such a system would result in 
training exercises for all communities on how to prepare for future events. A 
fundamental constraint on the ability of NGOs to contribute to AARs and 
participate in exercises, however, is lack of funding for training and travel for such 
purposes. An additional problem for all communities was that those who might go 
through such training would not necessarily end up running operations on the 
ground.  
 
Scenario 2: Key Findings 
 
The scenario deliberately set the stage for a conflict between humanitarian and 
military medical priorities. The groups’ discussions throughout the day and during 
the closing plenary session reflected this tension. Again, the issues of gaining 
access to information and access to affected populations were critical points of 
contention.  
These needs were primary to the NGO and UN communities, whereas the 
military and the embassy players were in the position to provide information as 
well as facilitate access. There was general agreement that a standard set of 
information requirements could be developed and given to those agencies, 
particularly the military, in advance. Such advance knowledge would allow 
information to be shared as soon as a crisis occurred. Participants agreed that 
the primary information needed at this stage included:  The status of 
infrastructure such as water, sanitation, shelter, medical clinics, and public health 
facilities; the number of people living in the disaster zones’ population 
movements of those affected; and terrain and transportation requirements to 
bring in aid. 
The embassy’s and military’s political and security missions, however, 
constrained their ability to share information with other agencies. In the early 
stages of the conflict, the military would not be willing to allow NGO access to the 
conflict zones. However, given the magnitude of the disaster, both communities 
suggested that they would pressure the government to allow humanitarian 
organizations access to the devastated areas. They also said that they would 
pursue a joint strategy, using the distribution of direct and indirect aid, to promote 
their own government’s interest in generating popular goodwill towards the 
United States and the host government.  
 
 
All parties said that the media significantly influenced where and when assistance 
was delivered. They agreed that all communities, as well as the parties to the 
conflict, would seek to manipulate the media to their own organizational 
advantage.  
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Part III. Humanitarian Medical and Health Assistance in the 
Event of Avian Influenza 
 
 
The third day of the simulation exercise presented the participants with a rapidly 
unfolding scenario based on the appearance of influenza in birds and its mutation 
to a human-to-human virus, in a country recently recovered from internal conflict. 
Such a scenario remains hypothetical at this time, yet it highlights how the 
various medical and health communities may need to cooperate in such a 
complex environment. The role of national governments in the response to avian 
influenza is of central importance in such scenarios. Dr. Joel Selanikio, former 
Senior Health Advisor within the Office of the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), provides an overview of the US government’s role in medical 
and health assistance. A description of the third day’s scenario and a synopsis of 
the participants’ discussion and key findings follow his chapter.  
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The Role of the US Government Non-Military Health and 








ROLES AND CAPABILITIES IN A WORLD OF RISK 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, it has been a matter of contention as to whether 
violent conflicts are increasing worldwide, with one recent major report 
contending that violent conflict has been on the wane.19 Whether there has been 
a general increase or decrease, there have certainly been enough wars to cause 
untold death and hardship. In the Congo alone it is likely that more than one 
million excess deaths occurred because of the conflict there, most of them due to 
the collapse of health and nutrition infrastructure, rather than violence.20
There is also debate as to whether natural disasters are increasing, due to global 
climate change or some other factor. Certainly, however, the very recent 
examples of Hurricane Katrina in the United States and the Indian Ocean tsunami 
have been a rough reminder of the ability of nature to wreak havoc. 
Consider now the combination of war and natural disaster:  The difficulty of 
providing care and resources to survivors of natural disasters is often greatly 
complicated by the difficulty of staying alive in a zone of conflict – both for 
“victims” and for responders. The term “complex humanitarian emergency” is 
often applied to these situations, as shorthand for “humanitarian emergency 
where you might get shot.”  
And a further risk can be found in the emergence of new disease threats such as 
HIV and SARS, born from the expansion of human populations into previously 
unsettled areas, contact with previously isolated animal species, increasing 
international travel, agribusiness practices which may exacerbate natural illness 
among animals, and other factors.
                                                 
 
* Datadyne Group, former Senior Health Advisor within the Office of the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services. 
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Funding 
The US government (USG) has, of 
course, a wide variety of non-
military resources available for 
responding to humanitarian 
emergencies. It is important to keep 
in mind that the vast majority of 
those resources are not directly 
related to provision of clinical 
medical care, or even public health 
practice:  The biggest impact that 
the USG has on health care in 
disasters is through funding.  
An example can be found in the 
USG participation in the response to 
the October 8th, 2005, earthquake in 
India and Pakistan. So far the USG 
has contributed, through the US 
Agency for International 
Development , more than $60 
million dollars for humanitarian 
assistance in the areas affected. 
And although the Indian and 
Pakistani governments, and NGOs, 
are providing the vast majority of 
health care in the affected regions,22 
the list of other organizations 
(“implementing partners”) receiving 
funding from the USG covers most 
of the major players in the response, 
as is evident in the sidebar 
(covering only Pakistan, with 




Partial USG Spending on Pakistan  
Earthquake Relief 21
(health-related in blue, non-health in black) 
Organization Role USG Funding 
ACTED Relief supplies, 
























for work, water 
and sanitation 
3,750,000 
ICRC Emergency relief 
supplies, shelter 
5,000,000 
IMC Water and 
sanitation 
1,900,000 
IOM Supplies and 
transport 
3,000,000 
IRC Shelter, supplies, 
child protection 
2,483,041 








UNICEF Water and 
sanitation 
2,000,000 
WHO Health 2,000,000 
WFP Logistics, food 8,917,459 
  $52,325,958 
 
As a point of reference, the USG is spending 
about $200 million per day on military operations 
in Iraq, not including reconstruction. 
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DIRECT RESPONSE 
 
In addition to providing funding to other organizations to mount a response, the 
government does have a variety of non-military assets that it can bring to bear in 




The US agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has developed a structure for leading the US 
government response to international disasters: The Disaster Assistance 
Response Team (DART). The DART acts in concert with the most senior local 
US diplomatic representatives, combining the on-the-ground expertise of the 
latter with its own knowledge of response techniques and capabilities; serves as 
the coordinating group for USG non-military activities; and as the focal point for 
USG civil-military coordination. 
 
DART Team Leader Bill Berger with ICRC at US Disaster  
Assistance Center, Chaklala Airbase,  
Rawalpindi, Pakistan (Photo: USAID) 
 
 
A DART team will often have a medical disaster specialist on the roster, who can 
play a role in assessing current public health and medical status at the disaster 
site. This is particularly useful early on, when others with that expertise, such as 
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the World Health Organization (WHO), or the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), 
may not yet have arrived.24
 
The DART team can provide an essential framework for any other USG teams 
that arrive, including CDC experts. The DART team provides a context in which 
those teams can be most productive – not to mention assisting in arranging 
transport and communications. 
 
The USAID Field Operations Guide25 lists some other potential activities of the 
DART: 
 
 Providing technical assistance to the US ambassador in formulating and 
executing an appropriate USG response to the disaster;  
 Developing and, on approval, implementing OFDA’s response strategy;  
 Continuing to assess and report on the disaster situation and recommend 
follow-up actions, including suggested funding levels;  
 Coordinating the movement and consignment of relief commodities;  
 Analyzing existing capacity of the infrastructure and relief agencies to 
ensure an appropriate, efficient response;  
 Reviewing and recommending approval for (or approving, when delegated 
the authority) relief program proposals;  
 Assisting in the coordination of the USG’s relief efforts with the affected 
country, other donors and relief agencies and, when present, other USG 
entities, including the US military; and 










Within the federal government, the provision of clinical medical – as opposed to 
public health and epidemiological – capabilities for foreign disaster response is a 
role that has traditionally been filled by the various components of the US military, 
although several International Medical and Surgical Response Teams (IMSuRTs) 
are maintained in affiliation with the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), 
formerly a part of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) but now 
a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The IMSuRTs are similar to the well-
 
OFDA’s FY2005 budget was $232.8 
million, not counting additional USAID 
funding administered by OFDA. 
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known Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) but have the capacity to 
provide surgical services, and are specifically international in mission (and 
name).  
 
The Resource Specification for the IMSuRT teams26 notes that there is currently 
only one IMSuRT that is at “level 1” readiness, which entails being able to: 
 
 begin deployment to OCONUS (“outside the continental US”) location 
within 3 hours of notification; and 
 staff two operating room suites that provide emergency surgery, treatment, 
and stabilization. 
 
The specification further notes that “IMSuRT does not usually function in an 
austere environment without additional support,” which could limit the usefulness 
of the team in certain post-conflict or post-disaster settings. 
 
There has been only one overseas deployment of an IMSuRT, to Iran for the 
December 26th, 2003 magnitude 6.6 earthquake in Bam. That deployment 
consisted of 57 people who operated a mobile surgical clinic for less than two 
weeks.27
 
IMSuRT ICU Nurse Jenifer Albert monitors a patient in  
the intensive care unit after the Bam earthquake 
(Photo: Marty Bahamonde/FEMA) 
 
One of the reasons for the sparse deployments and clinical medical resources 
available in the non-military community is the perceived lack of funding for 
deployments. When DMATs deploy domestically, they are covered by in-place 
funding programs, including Stafford Act funding for disasters. When there is the 
potential for overseas deployment, however, Stafford Act and other domestic 
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funding programs do not apply and it is usually left to DOD, with existing logistics 
and transport at the ready, to provide medical teams if they are felt to be 
necessary. 
 
There have also been the expected disconnects and difficulties associated with 
the transition of the NDMS system into DHS, and these may take a long time to 
sort out:  One highly placed senior manager within DHS recently told me that “the 




For public health and epidemiology within disaster settings, the USG non-military 
assets actually eclipse their military equivalents in some cases. Many of these 
assets are contained within the CDC, but several other federal organizations play 
a prominent role, particularly in laboratory response. 
 
Non-Laboratory Assets: Epidemiologic Expertise 
 
CDC plays a lead role in providing epidemiological expertise for response to 
terrorism, natural disasters, technological or complex disasters, and emerging 
disease outbreaks (e.g., West Nile virus or avian influenza). 
  
 
CDC worker in Angola taking samples for Marburg Virus  
(Photo: Center for Biologic Counterterrorism and Emerging Diseases) 
 
It would be hard to find a complex emergency or displaced-persons scenario 
where CDC field epidemiologists have not played a role in providing consultation 
on nutrition, public health, water & sanitation, and worker health. 
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One of the most useful roles these 
experts can play is in advising the 
authorities on the ground in how to 
investigate and monitor a variety of 
measures crucial to evaluating and 
following the health of the affected 
population (see sidebar, next page). 
Epidemiological concepts such as 
rates, case definitions, and 
surveillance are some of the most 
important tools in establishing 
adequate “situational awareness” on 
the ground. Roles for CDC or other 
government epidemiologists include: 
 
 Identification or confirmation of 
critical problems – often there is 
an important role in simply 
confirming whether a health risk 
(such as an outbreak of disease) 
actually exists or not (“is it real?”).  
 
 Investigation of causes and risk 
factors – what are the 
predominant causes of death and 
illness, or their accompanying risk 
factors, that can be used to plan 
interventions? Similarly, 
evaluation of risk factors can be 
used to determine the cause of 
an outbreak. 
 
 Monitoring of health trends – 
which provides an essential tool 
for program planning as well as 
something of a general report 
card for those responsible for the 
well-being of the affected 
individuals. 
 
 Evaluation of impact of health programs – putting a program in place to 
combat a health problem is a good first step, but scrutinizing at regular 




Principal Epidemiological Indices in Caring for 
Large Populations in Complex Emergencies and 
Disasters 
 
- Population size 
Used in planning for essential services:  Food, water 
and sanitation (“wat/san”), shelter, medical 
services. Also essential in providing a denominator 
for calculations of rates (see below). 
 
- Birth rates 
Essential in planning for clinical services as well as 
supplemental nutrition programs and long-term 
population care. 
 
- Mortality rates 
 
Crude mortality rate (CMR) 
Used as a general indicator of a population’s 
health, measured in deaths per 10,000 persons 
per day. A rate of less than 1 death/10,000/day is 
considered as indicative of generally effective 
relief efforts in complex emergencies. 
 
Under-five mortality rate (U5MR) 
General indicator of children’s health, measured in 
deaths per 10,000 children per day. A rate of less 
than 2 deaths/10,000/day is considered an 
indication of generally effective relief in complex 
emergencies. 
 
- Morbidity rates 
 
Cause-Specific Mortality Rates 
Death rate due to specific disease, e.g., 167 
deaths from trauma/1000/month 
 
Case Fatality Rates (CFR) 
Proportion of individuals with specific disease that 
die, e.g., CFR for cholera = 25% 
 
Age- and Sex-Specific Mortality Rates 
Useful for monitoring vulnerable populations, 
including the very young and the very old. 
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Laboratory Assets 
 
While there are many sources of epidemiological expertise that have participated 
and will continue to play a role in complex emergencies, disaster response, and 
outbreak investigation, there are many fewer organizations that are able to 
maintain world-class laboratories, and put them at the disposal of field 
responders. When the issue concerns laboratory investigation of human disease, 
CDC is predominant, and has led in the development of the Laboratory Response 
Network (LRN). The mission of the LRN is to: 
 
maintain an integrated national and international network of laboratories 
that are fully equipped to respond quickly to acts of chemical or biological 





In order to accomplish this mission, the LRN coordinates the training of and 
communications among federal (including CDC, FDA, USDA), as well as 
participating military, state, and local labs in the United States, in addition to labs 
in Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia. It would be difficult to overestimate 
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the importance of the LRN, organized in advance to respond rapidly to significant 
and unusual health events including the emerging disease threats of SARS, West  
 
 
Nile virus, and avian influenza. CDC’s labs, in particular, are of key importance in 
the response to international outbreaks or situations of concern, since most of the 
LRN is focused on the domestic United States. The veterinary labs at USDA also 
play a critical role, particularly when animal samples are to be tested or the safety 
of the food supply is in question. 
 
 
CHALLENGES OF COMPLEX EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS 
 
As indicated in the previous sections, there is a great deal of health expertise 
within the US government. Still, there are great challenges in deploying that 
expertise to good use in a complex emergency or natural disaster, challenges 
that affect the ability of those with that expertise to do their jobs effectively and to 
make it home in one piece. These challenges include: 
 Minimizing the risk of violence 
 Personnel preparedness 
 Organization and logistics 
 
Minimizing the Risk of Violence 
Iraq is the current best example of a hostile environment for aid workers (whether 
one chooses to classify it as “post-conflict” or “right in the middle of conflict”), but 
there are many others:  Colombia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Sri Lanka, etc. In these 
and other locations, there is the risk of random violence, violent crime, and 
political violence, in which the perpetrators associate the relief workers – correctly 
or incorrectly – with their political enemies, or judge that they will benefit from 
violence against responders. Given the current widespread dissatisfaction with 
 
LRN’s Role in SARS – 
During the initial stages of SARS it was CDC’s labs that 
sequenced the genome of the causative coronavirus, and 
that in conjunction with the LRN were able to develop 
techniques and materials that employ PCR (polymerase chain 
reaction) technology for rapid testing. Those techniques were 
widely disseminated, and form the basis for current SARS 
surveillance. 
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American foreign policy, it is not unreasonable to think that representatives of the 
USG are at even higher risk than their colleagues in the UN organizations or 
NGOs. 
There is no way to completely eliminate the threat of violence in this inherently 
unstable situation, short of staying home. Most – but certainly not all – 
humanitarian organizations provide security training to their personnel, and this is 
true of USG organizations as well. Sadly, this training is typically thought of as an 
administrative chore, one more checkbox to be checked in order to get to the 
work at hand. This means that security procedures in the field are often forgotten 
or ignored except after a violent event has taken place, and the longer the 
interval between violent events, the more difficult it becomes to maintain an 
careful security stance. 
 
While it is tempting in these cases to invoke “personal responsibility” for one’s 
own safety and security, incomplete or un-enforced security training and 
procedures greatly affect an organization’s ability to complete its mission, and it is 
the organization’s responsibility to properly train and equip its personnel. 
 
Violence can, of course, be directed at the population the responder is trying to 
serve, and make it nearly impossible to function. Those currently providing 
medical and public health care in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere need to re-
evaluate daily whether through their actions they may be increasing the risk to 
local populations. Examples of actions that increase such risks include raising the 
visibility of vulnerable groups or appearing to favor certain groups over others.  
 
Personnel Preparedness 
Each year many relief personnel put themselves needlessly at risk while 
responding to disasters by failing to undertake the appropriate preparations. As 
with violent events, often the risks of diseases -- such as malaria -- are ignored 
until after one finds oneself alone with shaking chills in the middle of nowhere. 
And as with anti-violence measures, the ultimate responsibility lies with the 
organization, not with the individual, to ensure that only well-equipped, well-
trained responders are able to participate. 
Organization & Logistics 
 
The chaotic response to the anthrax attacks of late 2001,30 as well as the widely-
criticized response to Hurricane Katrina, poses a difficult question for 
international humanitarian response:  If coordination was so poor even within a 
single, very wealthy country, with a single federal structure, with well-drawn lines 
of authority, what chance is there for a well-coordinated response in a complex 
emergency or disaster elsewhere? 
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Poor coordination was certainly seen in the aftermath to the Indian Ocean 
tsunami of December 26th, 2004, although the coordination there between military 
and non-military (see box below) was much better for USG personnel (e.g., 
OFDA). 
 
One obstacle standing in the way of better cooperation in disasters and complex 
emergencies is the lack of a viable coordinating authority. It is often unclear as to 
who is in charge in a disaster setting, and responders may also resist a 
designated coordinating authority for a variety of reasons, including: 
 A belief that the coordinating authority is invalid or incompetent – in the 
aftermath of the tsunami, a USG epidemiologist, in explaining why he had no 
intention of attending the WHO-run health committee (and subcommittee) 
meetings, told me “They [WHO] can hold meetings, and meanwhile we do 
things.” 
 Competition for the public eye and donations – an NGO local coordinator in Sri 
Lanka: “[W]e do not get rewarded for quietly working in concert with the other 
NGOs, we get rewarded by getting ourselves on CNN.” This competition is not 
pronounced, in my experience, although most of us are at some point 
susceptible to the lure of seeing ourselves on television.  
 
Coordination Problems: Aceh after the tsunami 
In Aceh – the region hardest hit by the 
tsunami – a multitude of UN agencies, NGOs, 
and non-military USG personnel found 
themselves competing for operational space 
and resources. Separated from most of the 
devastated areas by impassable (or newly 
nonexistent) roads and without air transport, 
they had no information about the problems 
facing the victims and were unable to get to 
them. 31
The International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) described the 
situation among relief agencies, local authorities, 
and tsunami victims in Aceh as an “information 
black hole” noting that,  
Initially, aid organizations had to base their 
relief distributions on informed guesses – 
overwhelmed by logistics, they lacked the 
time to undertake detailed assessments or 
consultations with affected people.32
In my observation, most personnel in Banda  
were not overwhelmed by “logistics” (the health 
staff were not, for example, occupied by trying to 
find office space in Banda Aceh), they were 
rendered ineffective by lack of helicopters. It 
wasn’t that they didn’t have time to do 
assessments; it was that they couldn’t reach the 
bulk of the population that needed assessing. 
During the same period the US military was 
routinely flying missions (mostly dropping 
supplies, but also providing medical evacuations) 
up and down the coast.  
The problem here was not that the non-military 
personnel in Banda Aceh did not have helicopters 
of their own; every group cannot maintain the 
ability to move those kind of transport resources 
around the planet. And there were not enough 
helicopters based in Indonesia, or even nearby 
Singapore, to fill the need. 
The real problem was that there seemed to be 
no standard link between military and non-
military personnel that would immediately allow 
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These attitudes can be reflective of reality, or misperceptions, but it is difficult to 
work around them when there is no group with the power to enforce cooperation 
(and the USG personnel are far removed from supervisors in Atlanta or 
Washington). 
 
ANATOMY OF A RESPONSE 
 
There is a great deal of flexibility (i.e., a lack of standardization) in federal 
responses to disasters or emergencies overseas. In nearly a decade at CDC, the 
only hard and fast rule that I was ever told was that we could not enter a country 
on official business until an official request from that government (usually the 
Ministry of Health) had been received.  In recent years, the Office of the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (the parent department of CDC) has 
exerted greater control and authority over CDC activities in general, and this 
extends to travel and to emergency response. One aspect of this has been to 
institute or enforce protocols for, for example, contacting embassy personnel on 
arrival in country. 
 






Before responding, CDC would need to hear about any 
outbreak, and this might happen through a number of 
routes, because of the web of personal connections 
connecting CDC personnel to their counterparts in other 
countries. A physician or public health official in the 
affected area might contact a colleague at CDC directly, 
who might or might not be in the correct division of CDC. 
Alternatively, they might contact their local WHO 
representative first. There is great variability in the 
timeliness of such contacts and notifications:  In Haiti in 
1994-5, a fatal outbreak of kidney disease of unknown 
cause killed more than 100 children over a period of more 
than 6 months before CDC was notified.33
 
Often, as with SARS, political considerations weigh heavily 
in the notification process. In 2003, as the SARS epidemic 
was spreading through China, China intervened to prevent 
Taiwan from communicating with WHO about the 
epidemic. Taiwan then contacted CDC through informal 
channels to share information, thus allowing the USG to 
pressure China to provide information and, eventually, 
access.34
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Invitation 
As indicated above, CDC requires official invitation before 
launching or participating in any type of overseas 




CDC’s response to any request for assistance will vary 
depending on the perceived severity of the problem, the 
weigh-in of the Secretary’s office, the personnel available, 
transport resources, and other factors. As with the other 
stages of this process, the time frame for response 
initiation is highly variable. 
  
Arrival  
As noted above, there is considerable variation in 
response protocol, but generally a CDC responder will 
receive a briefing from US embassy staff in-country, which 
will include a security briefing. The responder will, of 
course, make rapid contact with local public health 
officials and local WHO staff. In the context of a disaster 
or other humanitarian emergency, it is likely that the 
CDCer will contact OFDA personnel (e.g, the DART team 




The activity varies, depending on the scenario. Some 
possibilities: 
 
o Unconfirmed outbreak in resource-poor country  
The fewer the resources commanded by local health 
authorities, the greater the CDC involvement is likely 
to be. In a potential outbreak setting in a resource-
poor environment, CDC may play a very active role in 
taking steps to confirm or disprove the outbreak:  
 
 initial data collection; 
 development of a case definition; 
 case-control35 or other investigation; 
 sample collection; 
 interviews of those affected or their family 
members; 
 dispatch of samples to the closest appropriate 
laboratory; and 
 recommendation of control measures. 
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o Epidemiological consultation in refugee or IDP 
(internally-displaced person)36 setting   
Again, the activity will depend on the expertise already 
available. Many NGOs, for example, are expert in the 
care of mass populations, but may want to consult 
with CDC on a specific issue, such as the design of a 
surveillance system, or the interpretation of clinical 
data, or the implementation of other public health 
activities. 
 
o Technical support in resource-rich location         
In this setting, CDC might be called on to provide a 
particular technical service not available elsewhere, 
such as provision of specialized lab testing. Even 
where epidemiologists are well-supplied, however, 
CDC can be called in to provide general consultation in 
order to arbitrate between two groups, or simply 






The resources of the US government are enormous, and can play a powerful role 
in the international medical and public health response to natural disasters, 
humanitarian crises, and complex emergences. Whether they do play a role can 
depend upon politics, coverage of the crisis in the media and subsequent public 
consciousness, national strategic interests, and many other factors, and the role 
itself can encompass funding, direct provision of medical care, coordination of 
response assets, and technical assistance from the many world-class experts 
within the government. 
 
 
In the past, international responses have at times been marked by a lack of 
coordination between military and non-military resources, between national and 
international assets, and between the various response groups. This lack of 
coordination can be the result of chaotic circumstances on the ground, a clash of 
organizational culture, or a competition for funding and attention. As we go 
forward, an increasing amount of attention will be paid to the interaction of these 
organizations, their roles, and how they fulfill those roles, and this may provide for 
greater efficiencies in collaboration, but only if the varied factors determining – or 
discouraging – cooperation are openly addressed. 
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Scenario 3: Bird Flu amidst Post-Conflict Reconstruction  
The third day’s scenario begins with the recent history of a United Nations 
peacekeeping mission (UNAF) and a US-Aliyan bilateral counter-insurgency and 
counter-terrorism operation. The scenario begins as if the preceding two days’ 
scenarios had not taken place.  
JTF forces have been departing Aliya for two weeks. The only forces that remain 
are a medical team, two civil affairs members, and one anti-terrorism combat unit. 
Aliya now has a relatively stable government after last year’s constitutional reform 
and last month’s general elections. Millions of dollars in reconstruction funds 
have brought work to Aliya and, therefore, money to the local population. Several 
Asian airlines are now stopping in the capital of Joka as more tourists arrive to 
explore the beauty of the island, and the service industry increases its 
percentage of GDP. Approximately two million people travel in and out of Joka 
each year. The entire country is open to humanitarian operations and most 
districts are being covered by international groups working alongside Aliyan 
Ministry and civil service workers. The markets are full of locally grown produce 
and livestock, intermingled with various imported items.  
Scenario 3, Part 1: Initial Reports of Influenza in Poultry 
A medical research team working in the west has noted an influenza virus 
subtype present in some of the farm poultry they tested. There has been no 
abnormal illness among poultry workers in the areas the team was working. 
Since no new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans, no further 
action is taken or recommended. Agriculture NGOs, working in other parts of the 
island, however, have reported an unknown infection that seems to be 
contagious among livestock, particularly poultry.  
Participants, playing the role of medical director for their organization in Aliya, 
were asked whether this situation was relevant to their organization, and if so, 
what their proposed course of action would be, and if there were any health or 
indirect issues that this scenario raised for their organization.  
 
All players took the news of the reports of influenza in poultry very seriously. The 
military participants were unanimous that the situation was relevant to their 
organization for force health protection reasons as well as protecting the United 
States. They were sending troops home and would want to know if these 
individuals were carrying any diseases. They noted that post-deployment medical 
screening is now a routine procedure, and based on its results, they would inform 
their command as well as their local health care personnel on what to look for 
when doing the screening. They would seek information on the troops that had 
already returned to the United States, as well as screen those still in-country. 
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Their medical teams would inform the host government regarding the results. 
Some military participants wanted to go further and seek to verify the information. 
They wanted to ensure that a trusted authority (CDC, WHO or, if necessary, the 
military itself) conducted proper testing and investigations. Some might also 
increase preventive medical measures, such as hand washing. Some military 
players noted that the situation raised concerns about their food supply, as they 
were eating local produce.  
 
Several military and embassy players noted the need to control rumors. They 
commented that the news might severely impact the local economy and even the 
state of civil peace. The host government would be divided internally about how 
to manage the situation, with the Ministry of Tourism and Economy unwilling to 
jeopardize economic recovery by making a public announcement. Other indirect 
issues for the military concerned geographical and public affairs planning, 
including whether there was a need to evacuate US citizens and NGOs. They 
would need to begin to plan ahead for a crisis. 
 
As with the military, most embassy players said that the situation would be of 
importance to them in light of the overall concern regarding avian influenza. They 
would report the information back to Washington and encourage the host 
government to report to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and 
WHO, and to permit the transport of specimens to a WHO laboratory. One 
embassy player noted that while the issue at present was an agricultural issue, 
because of heightened concerns about avian flu, health and agricultural 
ministries were working more closely together. This was even more the case at 
the international level, with much greater coordination between WHO and FAO.  
 
One embassy player noted that the issue was immediately of regional or even 
global concern, because of the island’s tourism industry and fears of a global 
outbreak. The embassy players would be prepared, if the situation warranted it, 
to take action to manage the situation through the MOH.  They would seek 
information on the scale of the poultry industry in the country as well as have their 
medical research team look at local capabilities (such as laboratories). They 
would seek to get CDC - though this would require host country permission - or 
other qualified experts involved, and conduct an epidemiological study of poultry 
workers. However, given the concerns about regional spread of avian flu, the 
embassy would be making decisions with regard to the safety of other countries 
beyond its normal interest in supporting the host government. Only one embassy 
player said that this level of response from the embassy was unlikely, even 
though it was ideal.  
 
 
The priorities for the embassy players was to assess the funding available to deal 
with a potential avian influenza outbreak, what the equipment stockpile would be, 
how much personal protective equipment (PPE) was available, and what the 
protocols for distribution would be. One US government participant noted that the 
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United States wanted to work with NGOs on this problem, to establish a 
formulary and help the USG understand what needed to be purchased for 
stockpiles. He felt that information about the contents of “single response kits” 
being developed by USAID for poultry cullers and first responders, as well as 
protocols, should be made available to the NGO community now. The embassy 
players would call for preprinted avian influenza materials (which USAID is 
currently developing in pictogram form) to be sent to the country. Indirect issues 
for the USG included the possibility that any DART team would have to be staffed 




(Graphic courtesy of UN FAO Emergency Prevention System  
[EMPRES] for Transboundary Animal and Plant Pests and Diseases) 
 
 
The NGO players also believed the information was relevant, but most said it 
would not effect their current operations. All said they would want to track the 
situation. Some said they would send out an information sheet to staff to avoid 
contact with poultry and to report cases of influenza-like illness, and would 
include the news in their reports to headquarters. This would likely trigger alarms, 
and force headquarters to think about the potential need for evacuation as the 
situation evolved. Several NGO players suggested that there was a need to 
prepare for the worst-case scenario. Other NGO players said they would contact 
the embassy and WHO with the information, to find out what they should be 
doing. Their concern was that the infection might spread to other livestock or 
poultry, and in the longer-term, about the potential for a mass slaughter of the 
population’s sources of protein. They would hope that a coordination meeting 
mechanism would be in place among the humanitarian agencies and embassies 
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to share information.  Indirect issues for NGOs include finding the money to stock 
supplies of PPE, as well as liability issues for expatriate staff, even though 
informed consent forms are signed. NGOs also face the difficulty of attracting 
international staff if people are dying of bird flu and other infectious diseases in 
the line of work.  
 
For one NGO player, protection of his own staff’s health was the first priority. The 
organization would take steps, in the case of flu or bird flu, to ensure that staff 
had appropriate PPE, and that there was a system in place to guarantee 
evacuation of patients to an intensive care unit (ICU) somewhere outside of the 
country. He emphasized that this protocol was not representative of the 
humanitarian NGO community, only his organization.  For NGO staff involved in 
community livelihood programs, he would ensure they had PPE and were 
instructed to pull out at the first sign of bird flu. He noted that currently there were 
no guidelines, but that they were needed. 
 
UN players cautioned the others not to expect very much from the UN OCHA, as 
it would be transitioning out of the country, and transferring duties to the UN 
development agencies. They did not see a role for UN disaster and humanitarian 
agencies at this point in the scenario, as there was no crisis. WHO and FAO staff 
on the ground, however, would be monitoring and reporting on the situation, and 
coordinating with leading embassies. 
Scenario 3, Part 2: Unconfirmed Reports of Avian Influenza in 
Humans 
Medical officers at the embassy are working closely with the Aliyan government 
and university staff. Military medical officers are concentrating their efforts on the 
return of soldiers to the United States. NGO and UN medical officers are looking 
to expand their services into the rural areas and train a local cadre of community 
health workers.  
 
At a medical conference in the capital, participants hear reports of a new subtype 
of virus among rural agricultural workers, but no human-to-human spread. The 
Ministry of Health states that there have been small clusters of human-to-human 
transmission of the same virus, but only in highly localized areas. A week later, 
participants receive a report that indicates much larger clusters of human-to-
human spread, although still localized mostly in the foothills; there are, however, 
at least two suspected cases in the western and southern districts. The Aliyan 
government flatly denies any problems exist and has made it very clear that any 
organization reporting to the media or highlighting the virus in any public way will 
be asked to leave. Two doctors working with NGOs are not provided re-entry 
visas after leaving the country for vacation; they had previously described their 
concerns about the virus to a local paper.  
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Participants were asked how they would address the government’s concerns and 
actions, whether they would involve other organizations in their activities, what 
would be the first and secondary priorities from a purely health perspective, and 
what the direct and indirect impacts would be on their organization.  
 
The situation presented the NGOs with competing goals: staying in the country to 
provide services on the one hand, which would require complying with the 
government’s policies despite the need to protect their staff with often visible 
measures such as masks and other PPE or quarantining; and on the other hand, 
their broader responsibility to consider the larger impact and alert the world to the 
problem. Some said they would pull their expatriate staff from the field, and give 
their local staff the option to continue if they used PPE. Others agreed that they 
would require PPE for their staff at this point. Most NGOs said they would restrict 
their staff’s interaction with the press, especially in informal situations. They 
would continue to work through the MOH, but also participate in separate 
information-sharing meeting with the embassies, OFDA and other NGOs. They 
would try to use their local staff to communicate with the local population on how 
to treat their poultry. They would also ask their headquarters to contact the CDC 
quietly. They would remain focused on their own missions for the time being, 
however, while listening very carefully to what was going on in the international 
community.  
 
The embassy players said that at this point the embassy would be coordinating 
with other embassies and UN agencies to share information and develop and 
deliver a consistent message to the host government to open itself up to 
investigation. The embassy players would be pressing the host government to 
allow them to send samples to WHO labs to clarify the situation. They would also 
be talking quietly with NGOs to find out what they knew based upon clinic records 
from outlying communities, and whether they could access the affected 
communities to find out more information while conducting their own missions. 
 
Embassy players would also be enacting preventive health and protective 
measures for embassy personnel, and would contact the military to ensure that 
they had all the information and were conducting pre- and post-deployment 
screenings. They might begin testing embassy staff at this point. They would 
certainly undertake an internal public education campaign, as a first measure. 
They said that the host government should be the source of information and the 
public education campaign, but failing that, the information should come from 
WHO. They might try to convince the host government to treat the situation as 
normal influenza in order to launch a public health education campaign, but they 




In the view of the US government, UN and military participants, the fact that the 
host government was resisting transparency instantly made the situation a 
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political, not just a health, matter. The embassy players would also ensure that 
the US military troops who had returned home were monitored for the disease.  
They would follow international health regulations and inform the WHO of the 
potential threat. The CDC might issue a travel advisory, and begin quiet 
discussions with international commercial air carriers regarding supplies and 
evacuation. One embassy player suggested that already by this stage, if the host 
government refused to cooperate, the UN Security Council might move toward 
issuing resolutions to take control. Despite US interests in seeing the host 
government stabilized after a long civil conflict, the overarching US interest would 
be in preventing a major outbreak and spread of avian flu. Regional 
organizations, such as ASEAN, would be exerting enormous pressure on the 
host government as well. US government officials also said that they would be 
seeking to get viral samples for research into a possible vaccine. The 
international community’s priority is verification of the presence of the virus and 
observation of any modification of it that might have occurred. 
 
The military players suggested that their response at this time would not change 
significantly from their earlier reaction to the initial reports. They would remain 
focused on their impending departure until ordered to change their mission. The 
main changes would be to increase force health protection measures such as an 
informal quarantine, have personnel eat rations rather than the local food, and 
begin planning for airlift and evacuation contingencies. Much of this planning 
would be ramping up outside the country. They would also pressure the Aliyan 
MOH to open up and allow investigations, and educate their Aliyan counterparts 
on how to respond. They noted that since their mission was ending, they could 
act more aggressively than they might otherwise. 
 
UN players said that monitoring would continue, and the WHO, WFP, UNICEF 
and FAO would likely increase their activities in coordination with the local UN 
Regional Coordinator. They would suggest that the embassies consider a 
disaster declaration and recommend travel restrictions. They would hold 
contingency planning meetings to recommend interagency assessment as well 
as request antiviral medications from headquarters. 
 
Scenario 3, Part 3: Confirmed Reports of Bird-to-Human Avian 
Influenza 
 
A highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) is spreading in both poultry and 
humans. Eighteen people have been hospitalized and ten of them have died. It 
has been confirmed that the transmission is direct from birds to humans. No 
confirmed human-to-human cases have been discovered yet, but there are some 
cases that are suspect. In the eastern district, a wildlife expert, working with the 
Aliyan Ministry of Parks and Natural Resources, has found numerous dead 
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migratory birds infected with H5N1. It is now confirmed that the virus exists in 
both wild fowl and poultry, and that infection cases are present in all districts. The 
government of Aliya is adamant about keeping these findings out of the 
international media. The successful tourism sector of the country, bringing in 
millions of dollars and thousands of jobs, would be devastated. Behind the 
scenes, the government asks for international help without drawing attention to 
the situation or publicly recognizing that a potential disaster exists. The Ministry 
of Agriculture is working with the Ministry of Health on a plan that would eradicate 
70% of the poultry and 50% of the wild fowl.  
Participants were asked to develop their recommended course of action in light of 
this information:  what they would advise their headquarters regarding support of 
the government’s eradication programs; how they would handle media enquiries; 
and whether the scenario posed issues outside their organization’s competence 
that would impact the health services.  
 
Military players said they would continue their force health protection and ensure 
that they had supplies of antiviral medications, such as Tamiflu. They would 
coordinate with the embassy and CDC to bring in survey and vaccination teams; 
they also would bring in military veterinarians to train the host government’s 
military to perform direct interventions in animal and human populations, and to 
properly dispose of the birds. The funds for this would be fairly easily obtained; 
the main constraint would be getting equipment and teams overseas.  
 
They noted that before acting, there would be a very large amount of strategic-
level dialogue going on within the US government as well as with UN agencies, to 
determine the proper course of action. They would be preparing to support any 
missions to which they might be assigned, while continuing to pressure the host 
government to cooperate. They would also assist the other communities as long 
as they had the capability to do so, even if it was not their primary mission. 
Redeployment to the United States, however, remains their primary mission at 
this point. One military participant noted that the key coordination problem was 
that US government strategic planning has been proceeding on this issue for 
some months. Washington would seek to have WHO take the lead; the main 
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Veterinarian Medical Readiness Training Exercise 
(Photo: US Army photo by Kaye Richey)
 
 
The embassy players said they would work with the host government on how 
properly to conduct the poultry eradication program, and how to replace poultry 
not only as a food supply but also as an economic resource. They emphasized 
that the animals should be isolated and prevented from flying away, in order to 
contain and then eliminate the gene pool. Embassy officials emphasized that 
discussion would be occurring at the highest levels of the Aliyan government, and 
would include representatives from every government agency working in a task 
force to handle the situation. This would have to be chaired by the host country’s 
president to make coordination effective. Guidance would be coming directly from 
the State Department to the US ambassador to the embassy medical team and 
USAID. The embassy officials would “make it very clear that there is no longer 
any option of delay. Action is required immediately.”  A public information 
campaign through the MOH would be essential.  
 
The embassy officials would be searching for more data to determine what the 
case load and burden of the disease are, as well as to evaluate the suspect 
human-to-human cases.  They would also be concerned with ensuring that those 
who had taken ill had access to health care. They would consider putting together 
a Regional Medical Team focused on the flu problem, and increasing funding for 
future planning. They would continue to try to develop a vaccine from the infected 
birds, as well as import medications to treat the sick. They suggested that a 
mandatory evacuation would only be ordered when human-to-human 
transmission had been confirmed. They also noted that if there was a localized 
outbreak, the US government could provide 100,000 doses of Tamiflu antiviral 
medication, via the WHO. 
 
 
NGOs agreed with the other participants that while all the communities had 
common interests in this situation, there would still need to be a significant 
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amount of discussion among the players. A key challenge from their perspective 
was who to talk with other than the CDC via the US embassy. For them the 
critical issue was to catch up with and participate in the ongoing interagency 
coordination, and to learn about mutual resources. They noted that they would 
also want to know what the case load was, and what measures would be 
advisable ( for example, would self-isolation work?) to prevent contamination. 
They stressed that the primary health centers in this country (outside of the 
capital) had a capacity of fewer than a dozen beds, so supporting patients in their 
homes would be necessary.   
 
NGOs and some embassy players noted that it was important to consider that if a 
mass slaughter was undertaken, it might significantly affect much of the 
population’s source of protein and/or livelihood. Culling would require NGOs to 
initiate food programs in order to stop popular unrest and resistance to the culling 
program. One NGO player noted that medical and health NGOs do not have the 
capacity to deal with avian flu. Other NGOs could address the long-term 
nutritional impact of the protein deficiency problem. Embassy and NGO players 
agreed that there should be a “cash for culling” program. One embassy player 
said that the IMF and World Bank would have to be involved in such 
compensation programs. A military participant pointed out that the World Food 
Program (WFP) or FAO had been proactively planning for this and may have a 
solution in place for the food crisis. Some NGOs said that if they had the 
personnel, they would participate in the eradication program. For the NGOs, 
protection of their staff remained important, and requests would go out to 
headquarters to provide PPE and antiviral medicines.  
 
During discussion among one of the break-out groups, it became clear that the 
NGO community currently lacks an effective means for coordinating or sharing 
guidelines on how to respond to avian flu. One NGO participant suggested that 
InterAction, an NGO consortium, might serve as coordinating body, but as of yet 
it did not have a mandate to communicate with members and non-members. The 
UN participant noted that the UN communicates regularly with umbrella NGOs 
such as InterAction for policy coordination and information exchange. In this 
group all communities agreed that they had identified a key problem, in that there 




There was some disagreement among the communities about what capabilities 
the United Nations could bring to bear in this situation. UN participants suggested 
that, given the scenario, the UN Regional Coordinator would want to work closely 
with embassies and the World Bank and IMF to establish an interagency task 
force. The UN would also try to assess the international, especially regional, 
impacts of the disease. They would urge the host nation to establish a task force 
involving all aspects of the host government (from defense, health and agriculture 
to public safety).  They would attempt to work out a common interagency media 
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strategy as well as a unified public health education campaign, and then pressure 
the host government to adopt it.  The UN participant cautioned the others that the 
WHO, UNICEF and FAO had limited funding for future planning and few early 
warning planners, so their capacity should not be overestimated. While there was 
a UN guideline in place for avian flu, it was not known or disseminated at the 
ground level. The UN participants also noted that NGOs were likely to be a more 
useful channel of information at this point that the UN. An embassy player noted 
that the participants had been operating on this flawed assumption that WHO 
was omnipotent in this situation; in fact, FAO would have the lead in responding 
to the outbreak among animals, while WHO would respond to the human 
outbreak. Another embassy player suggested, however, that WHO would have 
already brought in high-level officials, a large number of high-level consultants 
and doctors by this stage. Others suggested that ambassadors were going to be 
the key actors in this situation. 
 
The participants diverged in their views on how to 
handle the media in this situation. All agreed that it 
would be impossible to keep the situation out of 
the international press. NGOs would try to sidestep 
the issue in order to keep operating. All favored a 
common media approach, but emphasized the 





Scenario 3, Part 4: Avian Influenza Epidemic 
At the Joka International Airport, two people collapsed in the terminal and died 
within 24 hours. It is reported by the central hospital that the death was caused by 
the H5N1 virus. The Port Authority has requested the Ministry of Health to 
provide monitors for the harbors, as fifteen cases of the virus have been 
confirmed resulting in three deaths. Ten tourists – three from Japan, two from the 
United States, two from the Philippines, one from Thailand, and two from India – 
who recently returned to their own countries from Aliya, have fallen ill and been 
diagnosed with the H5N1 virus. Two of these tourists have died. Three other 
deaths attributed to the H5N1 virus were people who had never been to Aliya. 
One was a caregiver for one of the ill tourists and the other two may have had 
exposure to one of the other returning tourists. Locally, one in four of the rural 
population and two out of five in the urban centers are infected. The death toll is 
currently at 394 in Aliya. The international community is panicking and canceling 
all flights from Aliya. The US Ambassador has requested military support to help 
quarantine the entire Aliyan Island. No one is allowed to leave the island, 
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including expatriate UN and NGO staffs. The international media are playing up 
the fears of a pandemic and there is a general state of panic. Other Asian 
countries are on alert for similar illnesses and/or deaths, but as yet none have 
reported any cases of the H5N1 virus.  
Participants were asked how this situation would affect their organization, what 
advice their organization would provide to the host government and people, 
whether they would participate in the quarantine activities, what an ideal 
response to the scenario might look like, and what, if any, recommended 
changes they would make to their parent organization for future coordination in a 
disaster and/or conflict setting.  
 
This scenario immediately posed in dramatic form a conflict between the 
humanitarian goal of treating and aiding the local population as the epidemic 
spread throughout the island country, and the broader humanitarian and security 
interests in preventing the global spread of the avian flu.  
 
For the US military and government officials, as well as the UN participants, the 
first priority was to prevent the epidemic from becoming a pandemic. This 
immediately moved the question from one of health and medical response to one 
of political cooperation. All players agreed that the need for cooperation among 
the UN agencies, the neighboring countries, the United States and the host 
government would be urgent and high-level. UN participants suggested that in 
this situation, WHO would convene a regional meeting to take steps regarding 
monitoring travelers, screening incoming flights and the like. They noted that the 
UN Secretary General had created a special advisor for avian flu, who would be 
deeply involved at this stage. There was disagreement among the UN and US 
civilian players about whether the UN Security Council would be involved. UN 
players thought it unlikely, while US players noted that a scenario such as the 
one outlined above was “uncharted territory,” and “would be a case where the 
boundaries of the concept of security are expanded;” thus it was likely the UN 
Security Council would invoke its Chapter VII authority.  
 
 
The military and US government players agreed that Washington would not 
unilaterally impose a naval quarantine around the island. This would be a 
coalition effort, most likely organized through a regional organization such as 
ASEAN or even the UN. Military players noted that while there had never 
previously been a naval peacekeeping operation, it could easily be done. They 
suggested that it would be unlikely that the US military would be involved in it, 
both because there would only be approximately fifty members of the JTF left in 
the country at this point, and because neighboring countries would have a vested 
interest in isolating the country by patrolling their own borders and territorial seas. 
Their own navies would enforce a blockade to prevent refugees from fleeing the 
afflicted country by boat. This raised issues of international humanitarian law, and 
military players suggested the UN would need to determine when these forces 
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could cross into the afflicted country’s territorial waters to enforce the quarantine. 
The US civilian and military players all emphasized that the United States would 
not act on its own in such a situation.  
 
At the operational level, US military players focused on the requirements for an 
evacuation of all US citizens, and for those US NGOs that refused to leave 
initially but might need to be brought out later. For the military, the issue was 
whether (and to what locations) US nationals would be evacuated for quarantine 
and isolation or treatment, given that the host government had said no one was to 
leave the country. There was considerable disagreement among the military 
players over whether US nationals would be evacuated, or whether medical 
equipment and hospitals would be brought in to treat them in place. Players 
noted that the most effective treatment required ICUs and ventilation equipment. 
They also expressed concern about the capacity for treatment of evacuees both 
regionally and in their home countries. The military participants noted that the US 
Air Force had a large amount of ventilators in the United States, and evacuees 
might be able to be treated there. But the military players also significantly 
disagreed over whether the US military would commit resources to this situation, 
given their current operational commitments in other areas. 
 
US government participants at the operational level, focused on isolating their 
own staff, ensuring they had PPE, and planning for evacuation of non-essential 
embassy personnel and US citizens. They would also caution against refugees or 
US nationals being treated on US Navy ships (such as the USS Mercy), as this 
would only prompt the local population to flee to these ships. Military players 
noted that their ships had very little capacity to treat the sick. The embassy 
players would request that the US government increase the production of 
vaccines and medications, to be available in the event of a pandemic. They 
would also want to ensure that there was a buffer stock of vaccine and antiviral 
medication available to the host government, in order for it to continue 
functioning. Government participants further noted that this scenario presented a 




NGOs divided on how they would respond. Some noted that they would be 
concerned with evacuating their expatriate staff and ensuring their treatment, and 
would at a minimum call them back from their field operations in order to isolate 
them from the disease. Others disagreed and said they would continue to try to 
treat the sick, and bring in more supplies and volunteers to do so. They noted that 
most of their clinical staff were locals, and that if they pulled them from their 
posts, health care for much of the population would cease.  It became clear that 
the medical and health NGO community needs to begin working with host 
countries’ national contingency plans for avian flu immediately. It was agreed that 
NGOs were the humanitarian community at largest risk, both because of the lack 
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of coordination and planning for this eventuality, and because of their direct 
contacts with the local population. 
 
When asked what an ideal response would require, 
all participants agreed that there was a great need for 
coordinated planning in advance of such events. 
They also agreed that prevention of a pandemic was 
the ideal. In a perfect world, a pandemic vaccine 
system would already be in place, according to US 
and UN officials. Currently, this is impossible, as 
there is insufficient industrial capacity to produce the 
vaccine prototypes and the actual vaccine. There are, 
however, national epidemic systems in place that 
could distribute it once it became available. Each 
country should be prepared in advance to prevent and 
contain outbreaks, with public health education, risk 
communication, sufficient stockpiles of antiviral and antibiotic medications, IV 
solutions, PPE and treatment facilities and clinical personnel, as these were the 
most cost-effective ways of preventing a pandemic. Military players noted that 
planning was proceeding at the strategic level, but had yet to reach the 
operational level. The international community and especially the NGO 
community were not sufficiently integrated into this planning cycle. Players also 
agreed that public education and information campaigns needed to be in place so 
that the population was aware and informed of how they needed to behave in the 
event of an outbreak of human-to-human avian influenza. 
 
Scenario 3: Key Findings 
It became clear in the discussions of the avian influenza scenario that the 
broader interest in preventing a pandemic would quickly trump the humanitarian 
concern for the local population. Despite the inevitable widespread coverage of 
people dying in the afflicted country, national and international interests in 
containing the disease would mandate isolation and quarantine of the island 
country and the turning away of refugees. Even before confirmation of a human-
to-human epidemic had occurred, the issue quickly shifted out of the purely 
health sector to become political, owing to the host government’s initial 
resistance to full disclosure according to the scenario. 
 
It was also clear that the communities diverged widely in how much planning for 
such a contingency had or was taking place. What was clear was that the scale of 
cooperation needed in the event of this scenario was enormous. The NGO 
community was least prepared (although an initial planning meeting on avian flu 
was taking place at InterAction at the same time as the Winter Game), while US 
 
H5N1 Avian influenza 
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CDC/C. Goldsmith) 
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civilian and military officials indicated that strategic and operational planning was 
accelerating. As participants noted, the roles in this scenario were very unclear, 
reflecting the newness of the threat. As one military participant pointed out, “What 
would an operational response look like? We haven’t gone down that road yet, so 
we still don’t know. We need maximum interagency and international 
cooperation. The United States may be one part of the response, but a US Joint 
Task Force is not going to come in and solve this.” There was general agreement 
that progress could be made if the communities could better define what their 
roles would be, and what could be expected of them in the event of an avian flu 
epidemic or pandemic. While everyone agreed on the absolute need for 
coordination, their lack of knowledge of each others’ roles and capabilities in this 
situation made it very difficult for them to figure out how they would operationally 
respond in this crisis. 
 
Significant differences of opinion emerged within and across the communities on 
how they would respond at the operational level. Much of this debate concerned 
questions of evacuation of expatriate citizens versus quarantine. However, there 
were also debates about whether treatment of the afflicted population was a 
priority, or whether the epidemic would instead be seen primarily as a vaccine 
research and public education opportunity for the global population. There was 
also agreement that the international community (FAO and WHO) would be 
heavily involved in ensuring proper culling and disposal of birds, as well as in 
establishing and funding poultry compensation programs (WFP, FAO, IMF, and 
World Bank). There was little common knowledge amongst participants about the 
resources available for such programs. One point of agreement was that all 
communities would want to find out what resources (PPE, ICUs, respirators) and 
medicines existed in the country and were available internationally. 
 
 
The general agreement was that the communities are not being proactive enough 
jointly or even individually to plan and implement policy and procedures at the 
operational level, before full-blown human-to-human transmission of avian flu 
occurs. All communities agreed that the main inhibitors to such advance planning 
were lack of funding, time and personnel. USAID only has one future planner, UN 
OCHA has none. At the UN, there were many personnel devoted to collecting 
information, but few doing analysis and even fewer conducting planning. The US 
military was best equipped in this regard. An additional complication for NGOs 
was the problem of not knowing what the appropriate future planning should be. 
Some, in the past, had sought such information from governments with regard to 
the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, but had gotten nowhere. 
Liability issues also diminished NGO interest in advance planning for such 
situations. Participants noted that such coordination and planning was made 
difficult, as NGOs had no overarching governing body. Each NGO makes its own 
contingency plans. Some participants urged the NGO community to begin to 
create an umbrella coordination structure to create and disseminate such policies 
and procedures. One noted that InterAction was just beginning to think along 
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these lines but did not yet have the authority to undertake planning and 
dissemination of policies and procedures. 
 
 
Another important outcome of the day’s discussion was the lack of awareness 
within and across the communities about what policies, guidelines, capabilities 
and resources each community had or was developing.  A tremendous amount of 
new information was shared among the participants about what planning was 
occurring at present. Participants were cautioned not to overestimate the 
capacities of WHO and FAO in such a crisis. Cooperation with donor and host 
governments would be essential. Both US civilian and military participants 
expressed a strong desire to include NGOs in the development of formularies 
and stockpiles, as well as distribution and response plans. It was clear that 
interagency cooperation between the US civilian and military agencies and the 
UN FAO, WHO, and WFP was much more developed than with NGOs. 
Participants also learned that countries were developing national contingency 
plans and that NGOs should immediately begin working with host nations on their 
development. Participants came away with a much greater knowledge of what 
resources were being developed and already exist, but equally that, if such a 
scenario were to happen today, coordination amongst the communities on the 
ground would be almost entirely ad hoc.  
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Improving Civil-Military Medicine in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Environments  
 
The growing interaction of civilian and military organizations providing medical 
and health assistance in complex emergencies suggests that much can be 
gained from better coordination and cooperation. Yet a number of factors, 
ranging from organizational missions, ideological opposition to working with 
armed forces, lack of funding and personnel for NGOs and IOs to carry out 
advanced planning or develop routine mechanisms for information sharing and 
coordination, hinder such cooperation in the health sector, and more generally.  
Participants in the CSRS 2006 Winter Game emphasized that operational 
coordination is often dependent on personal relations built during emergencies. 
They recognized that even though military organizations appear increasingly 
interested in incorporating humanitarian NGOs and IOs into their planning, such 
planning often proceeds without the contributions of these two crucial 
humanitarian communities.  
 
Participants learned that their different missions placed considerable constraints 
on the possibilities for close cooperation. For the military and civilian government 
agencies, their mission of advancing their government’s national interests limited 
their flexibility in responding to humanitarian crises. International organizations 
are constrained by the wishes of their member-states, and lack the capacity to 
proceed independently with humanitarian response and planning. Humanitarian 
NGOs, on the other hand, are driven by their mission of providing medical and 
health services to all human beings, regardless of national, ideological, ethnic, 
political or other loyalties. These different missions often collide in situations of 
conflict or post-conflict reconstruction. Despite these differences, participants 
sought to improve their coordination in light of their increasing interaction in 
complex emergencies. 
 
Over the course of the four-day exercise, it became clear that information sharing 
lay at the heart of health and medical cooperation in humanitarian emergencies. 
Participants from the military learned that humanitarian nongovernmental 
organizations had a fairly uniform set of health and medical information 
requirements that the military could often meet if informed in advance. At the root 
level of building a common parlance among the communities, the military learned 
that most NGO requests for assistance were actually requests for information. 
Yet NGOs were not willing to make information-sharing a fully two-way street, as 
this would fundamentally jeopardize their core principle of impartiality and likely 
endanger their personnel in the field.  
 
 
Despite this weak and ineffective quid pro quo system, participants from the 
military recognized that much information could and needed to be shared with 
NGOs. They recommended that NGO and other communities learn which 
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questions to ask in order to obtain information, and called on them to develop 
standardized health and medical information forms that would be used to build 
unclassified databases, which would be made available to the humanitarian 
response community in the event of a disaster. Participants generally agreed that 
the preferred nexus among the humanitarian health and medical communities 
was the United Nations OCHA, and secondarily civilian national agencies such 
as USAID OFDA. 
 
Mechanisms for operational coordination and information sharing are not 
institutionalized or planned in advance, and actors often re-learn the same 
lessons on the ground in each emergency. Too often AARs are done in isolation 
by an agency or body and therefore reflect organizational bias rather than 
general lessons learned. Repeatedly, over the course of the exercise, the need 
for a standardized, and if possible integrated, mechanism for conducting after-
action reviews that included all the operational players was emphasized. These 
after-action reviews should be collected and stored in open-access databases. In 
addition, these reviews needed to be analyzed, and their results pushed back out 
to the operational level through both simulation and training exercises, and policy 
and operations coordination meetings. Participants emphasized that too often the 
wrong people ended up at after-action reviews. It became clear that such reviews 
should occur at the operational level. Lessons learned should then not only be 
disseminated to operations officers, but up to headquarters and policy personnel 
to facilitate the development of plans and procedures for future operations. Such 
planning should also incorporate all actors in humanitarian crises. In particular, 
NGOs need to be incorporated as contributors to military and civilian agency 
planning rather than as observers, as is usually the case. 
 
Such a system for developing institutional memory currently does not exist. 
Participants recommended that one be developed, but few had suggestions 
which agency should or could host such a system. Participants noted that 
operational coordination is often dependent on relationships built on the ground, 
and is often hindered by policy coordination at higher-levels. Until a more 
centralized system for sharing and disseminating policies, procedures and 
operational lessons-learned is developed, such ad hoc personal relationships are 
likely to remain the key nodes in the humanitarian health and medical network, 
and emergency response with remain under-institutionalized.  
 
 
While participants recognized that operational coordination in complex 
emergencies was often ad hoc, and mistakes were often repeated in crisis after 
crisis, coordination does actually occur. Participants generally knew whom they 
would turn to on the ground and at headquarters in the event of a natural disaster 
or a complex humanitarian emergency. The game revealed that this is not the 
case with regard to avian influenza. While planning is underway at the strategic 
level for intra-governmental and international coordination in the event of an 
avian influenza epidemic or pandemic, such planning has yet to impact the 
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operational level. Only a few military and government participants had detailed 
knowledge of governmental and intergovernmental planning. They recognized 
that there was a broad lack of knowledge about resources, policies and 
procedures and a tremendous need for extensive coordination among all the 
communities present. Players, particularly NGOs, had contradictory and 
incomplete knowledge of who they should contact on the ground if an avian flu 
outbreak occurred. Most actors are unaware of what policies and resources are 
available in the various communities. NGOs are entirely unprepared for such an 
event. Both military and government officials called for greater incorporation of 
NGOs into governmental and UN strategic and operational planning for an avian 
flu epidemic and pandemic. 
 
In general, the simulation exercise demonstrated that the lack of coordination and 
information sharing is particularly acute among NGOs, and between NGOs and 
the other communities. NGOs compete with each other for funding, which inhibits 
intra-community cooperation. Also, the very nature of NGOs as niche-fillers for 
areas where state authorities cannot or will not work inhibits coordination. The 
humanitarian NGO community is extremely diverse, and includes organizations 
that refuse on principle to have any contact with military and even some civilian 
agencies. This further complicates efforts to establish coordination and 
information networks that span all members of all humanitarian health and 
medical communities. Participants recommended that efforts to coordinate need 
to aim for as much cooperation among communities as possible, but to accept 
that the benchmark for successful coordination will focus on what is feasible and 




The 2006 Winter Game successfully revealed the strengths and limitations of 
each health and medical community. The humanitarian NGO community’s 
greatest strength is its commitment and flexibility in responding to humanitarian 
disasters. It is the least encumbered by politics and the most able to deliver 
health and medical relief to those in need. The ongoing need to raise funds and 
secure resources is the NGO community’s most fundamental limitation. The need 
to raise funds dictates the presence, level and length of their medical and health 
responses to humanitarian emergencies. Competition for resources also 
significantly constrains nongovernmental organizations’ willingness and ability to 
cooperate with each other.  
 
 
The greatest strength of humanitarian intergovernmental organizations lies in 
their legitimacy as representatives of international norms and guidelines. They 
are most capable of acting as operational coordination nodes for NGOs 
committed to impartiality, and national civilian and military agencies with national 
interests in complex emergencies. However, humanitarian relief IOs have few 
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resources or personnel devoted to planning and are dependent on member-
states for commitment of medical and health supplies, equipment and distribution 
mechanisms. They are also limited in their response by the requirement to 
respect national sovereignty. They must lead from behind the scenes. 
 
National civilian governments’ greatest assets are their willingness and ability to 
commit resources to humanitarian medical and health assistance – resources that 
range from grants to NGOs, to trained health and medical personnel, to military 
medical corps and airlift capabilities. National governments are also increasingly 
recognizing links between health and medical emergencies and national security. 
National civilian agencies and IOs have a dearth of health and medical planners 
as well as first responders. Governments also appear increasingly to rely on their 
militaries in humanitarian emergencies. National civilian agencies are necessarily 
constrained by their government’s overarching national interests. This affects 
their willingness to fund particular operations and their ability to introduce their 
medical and health capabilities (civilian or military) without the consent of host 
governments. Pursuit of national interests also limits which organizations are 
willing to partner with national civilian agencies and vice-versa. This limits their 
suitability to serve as nodes in a cross-community information and coordination 
network.   
 
Finally, militaries share all the limitations of national civilian agencies, with the 
additional factor that they are often a party to ongoing conflict or post-conflict 
operations. They are increasingly called on by their governments to deliver health 
and medical assistance as a part of improving their government’s image in the 
host nation. This fundamentally alters their relationships with humanitarian NGOs 
and IOs, and severely limits their legitimacy as a lead actor in humanitarian 
medical and health responses. Moreover, military medical personnel are often 
trained and equipped for combat missions rather than humanitarian medical and 
health emergencies. They are reluctant to take central roles in disaster relief. Yet 
militaries are widely, if often reluctantly, recognized as having the best assets and 
logistical support to respond to humanitarian health and medical catastrophes. 
Their government’s and the international community’s growing recognition of 
humanitarian emergencies as threats to national and international peace and 
security have made military organizations permanent actors in the field of 
humanitarian health and medical assistance. As one participant noted, for the 
humanitarian community, time is the enemy in an emergency, and the biggest 




In the closing session of the 2006 Winter Game, participants noted the 
importance of such events to promote and further constructive dialogue on how 
these communities can better cooperate in the future. Participants emphasized 
that the development of personal networks was the first step toward building 
more institutional forms of cooperation. Participants recognized that since each 
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humanitarian emergency is somewhat different, it is difficult to recognize the 
lowest common denominator from which to plan. They agreed, however, that 
each disaster has enough similarities as it unfolds to make advance coordination 
not only possible but critical to success.  
 
 
Participants concluded that establishing a depository for information 
requirements, policy guidelines and protocols, as well as a mechanism for 
disseminating lessons-learned from humanitarian health and medical operations, 
would mark a significant step forward. NGO participants noted the CSRS 
educational game marked the first time an NGO was asked to co-sponsor an 
event with the US military, and that this was a positive move. The NGO 
community is very interested in further such cooperation. Military participants 
agreed, noting that civil-military medicine is increasingly a reality and even a 
priority for the US military. They suggested establishing an informal or quasi-
formal civil-military medicine contact group among the game participants to 
continue forward momentum. Participants concluded by recommending that the 
Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies continue to facilitate the 
communities’ identification of the key nodes in information and coordination 
networks, and focus on how operational lessons can and should influence 
change at the policy level to ensure operational success. 
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ACRONYMS FOR INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)  
AAH Action Against Hunger  
ACF Action Contre la Faim (Action Against Hunger)  
ACTED Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development  
ADRA Adventist Development and Relief Agency  
AmRC American Red Cross  
ARC  American Refugee Committee (also used for American Red Cross) 
CHF Community Habitat and Finance  
CISP Comitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo dei Popoli  (International 
Committee for the Development of Peoples)  
COOPI Cooperazione Internazionale (International Cooperation)  
CRS Catholic Relief Services  
CWS Church World Service  
FHI Food for the Hungry International  
GAA German Agro Action  
GOAL Although capitalized, GOAL is not an acronym 
IMC International Medical Corps  
IRC International Rescue Committee  
LWR Lutheran World Relief  
Merlin Medical Emergency Relief International  
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières  (Doctors Without Borders)  
NPA Norwegian People’s Aid  
PADCO Planning and Development Collaborative International  
PCI Project Concern International  
UMCOR United Methodist Committee on Relief  
 
International Organizations (IOs) and United Nations (UN) Agencies 
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO) 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)  
HACC Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center 
HICC Humanitarian Information Coordination Center  
HOC Humanitarian Operations Center 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross  
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies  
IOM International Organization for Migration  
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)  
PAHO Pan American Health Organization (WHO)  
UNDAC UN Disaster and Coordination  
UNDP UN Development Program  
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees  
UNICEF UN Children’s Fund  
UNSECOORD Office of the UN Security Coordinator  
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WFP World Food Program (UN)  
WHO World Health Organization (UN)  
 
U.S. Government (USG)  
AFMIC Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center 
CDC U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  
CMOC Civil-Military Operations Center 
DART Disaster Assistance Response Team  
DCHA Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance  
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance Team 
DMORT Disaster Mortuary Team 
DOD U.S. Department of Defense  
EDRC Emergency Disaster Response Coordinator  
EUCOM U.S. European Command  
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FEWS NET Famine Early Warning Systems Network  
FFP Office of Food for Peace 
IMSurT International Med-Surg Response Team, part of NDMS 
LRN Laboratory Response Network  
MDRO Mission Disaster Relief Officer  
NCEH National Center for Environmental Health, part of CDC 
NCID National Center for Infectious Disease, part of CDC 
NDMS National Disaster Medical System, part of DHS/FEMA 
OFDA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
OHDACA Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
OTI Office of Transition Initiatives  
PRM Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration  
PACOM U.S. Pacific Command 
SOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command  
State U.S. Department of State  
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development  
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture  
USG U.S. Government  
USGS U.S. Geological Survey  
USUHS Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences 
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